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VICTIM OR VILLAIN?: A CASE FOR NARROWING
THE SCOPE OF ADMISSIBILITY OF A VICTIM'S
PRIOR BAD ACTS IN ILLINOIS
INTRODUCTION*
Imagine that you are at the trial of the man who stabbed your sister
to death. The details of the incident in which your sister was killed are
unclear; however, you are aware that the man who stabbed your sis-
ter, the defendant, claims that your sister attacked him and that he
had stabbed her three times in the ribs in an act of self-defense. The
defendant is six feet tall and weighs approximately two hundred
pounds. Your sister was five feet tall and weighed a mere one hun-
dred pounds. The defendant's lawyer is questioning one of your sis-
ter's former friends about an incident that had allegedly occurred
between your sister and the friend in a bar approximately three years
ago. According to the friend, your sister had threatened her with a
knife because she had started dating your sister's boyfriend behind
your sister's back. Your sister's lawyer objects to the line of question-
ing and the defendant's lawyer argues that the incident is "undeniably
relevant to the defendant's self-defense claim." The judge overrules
the objection and the defendant's lawyer continues to elicit the details
surrounding the alleged incident. You look at the jury members who
are shaking their heads in disgust. You ask yourself, "How can this be
happening? My sister was a victim, but now the defendant's lawyer is
turning her into a villain in an attempt to get his client off."
The above scenario, while fictional, could happen. In Illinois,' a de-
fendant who is charged with a violent crime and who asserts self-de-
* The author would like to thank Peter Fischer for providing the idea for the substance and
structure of this article as well as invaluable preliminary research on the issue. In addition, the
author thanks Susan Haling, Evelyn Hinkle, Jim MacDonald, and Seth Neulight for their
insightful and detailed criticism.
1. Illinois has never adopted a version of the Federal Rules of Evidence, nor has Illinois codi-
fied its evidence rules according to any other system; rather, Illinois' rules of evidence are a
product of common law. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, CLEARY & GRAHAM'S HANDBOOK OF
ILLINoIs EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1990); Judge John P. Crowley, Illinois Evidence-The Question of
Codification, 10 Loy. U. CI. L.J. 297 (1979) (arguing for the codification of an Illinois Code of
Evidence); cf. Faust F. Rossi, The Federal Rules of Evidence-Past, Present, and Future: A
Twenty-Year Perspective, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (1995) (noting that "[e]ven the few
recalcitrant states that resist codification-like Illinois ... are slowly moving by court decision
toward piecemeal adoption of [the Federal] Rules").
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fense may offer evidence of the victim's prior bad acts (i.e., specific act
evidence) to prove one of two distinct evidentiary propositions:
(1) that the defendant was reasonably afraid of the victim at the time
of the incident in question; or (2) that the victim had been the aggres-
sor during the incident in question. Prior to 1984, Illinois courts, with
few exceptions, routinely ruled that evidence of a victim's prior bad
acts of which the defendant was aware at the time of the incident in
question is admissible to prove the former but not the latter.2
In 1984, however, the Illinois Supreme Court created an exception
to the above rule in the case of People v. Lynch.3 In that case, the
court held that evidence of the decedent's three prior convictions for
battery was admissible to support the defendant's contention that the
decedent was the aggressor, notwithstanding the fact that the defend-
ant was unaware of the prior convictions at the time of the killing.4
Based on the holding of Lynch, one might believe that the exception
created is confined to cases where the three following conditions are
met: (1) where the evidence is offered to prove that the victim was the
aggressor; (2) where the defendant is charged with homicide; and
(3) where the prior bad acts are in the form of a conviction for a vio-
lent offense. Some Illinois appellate courts, however, have not con-
fined Lynch to such a limited application. Rather, some courts have
read Lynch as allowing in all types of specific act evidence, not just
convictions, when self-defense is at issue, regardless of whether the
defendant is charged with something less than homicide and regard-
less of which of the two evidentiary propositions the evidence is of-
fered to prove.5
This Comment will analyze this broad reading of Lynch and will
determine whether this reading is appropriate. The questions for con-
sideration in making this determination are: (1) whether this reading
and application of Lynch is jurisprudentially sound; (2) whether the
pre-Lynch rule of admissibility is a more reasoned approach; or
(3) whether the Illinois courts should adopt a middle-ground approach
that would admit certain types of specific act evidence in certain fac-
tual contexts and preclude such evidence in other contexts.
To begin to answer these questions, it is necessary to examine spe-
cific act evidence in relation to the self-defense claim, Illinois' histori-
2. See, e.g., People v. Popovich, 129 N.E. 161, 163 (I11. 1920) (enforcing the established rule
that a victim's violent propensity may not be proven by specific acts); People v. Peeler, 299
N.E.2d 382, 386 (I1. App. Ct. 1973) (stating that it is "fundamental" that specific act evidence is
inadmissible to prove a victim's violent character).
3. 470 N.E.2d 1018 (I11. 1984).
4. Id. at 1020-21.
5. See infra part II.D (discussing the Illinois appellate courts' interpretation of Lynch).
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cal treatment concerning the admissibility of such evidence, and
alternative approaches to the current Illinois rule. Accordingly, this
Comment will first focus on character evidence generally and the dif-
ferent methods a party may use to prove an individual's character, 6
including specific act evidence. The author will examine the primary
rationales for either excluding or admitting specific act evidence that
is offered to prove that the victim was the aggressor. 7 This Comment
will then focus on the evolution of the admissibility of this type of
evidence in Illinois self-defense cases when it is offered to prove that
the victim was the aggressor, from the strict exclusionary rule of pre-
Lynch case law to the broad rule of admissibility established by the
post-Lynch cases.8 Next, this Comment will highlight alternative rules
that Illinois could adopt by first discussing the Cook County State's
Attorney's Office's proposed change to the current Illinois rule9 and
then discussing different rules adopted by other jurisdictions. 10 The
Comment will then identify the problems with the current Illinois
rule" and the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative rules.12
After examining the current and alternative rules, the author will con-
clude that Illinois should narrow its rule on the admissibility of spe-
cific act evidence offered to prove that the victim was the aggressor.13
The author will propose that Illinois should adopt a statute that limits
the admissibility of such evidence to include only evidence of a prior
conviction for a violent offense that is offered in a homicide case and
that is in the form of a certified letter of conviction.' 4
6. See discussion infra part L.A (discussing the two evidentiary propositions of a self-defense
claim that a defendant may offer character evidence to prove and the two different methods that
a defendant can use to prove a victim's character).
7. See discussion infra part I.A.2 (examining the policy arguments for admitting and for ex-
cluding specific act evidence in this context).
8. See discussion infra parts I.B-D (discussing pre-Lynch cases, the Lynch case and post-Lynch
cases).
9. See discussion infra part I.E (discussing the statute proposed by the Cook County State's
Attorney's Office which would return the Illinois rule to the strict exclusionary rule of pre-
Lynch).
10. See discussion infra part I.F (examining the admissibility of specific act evidence when a
defendant asserts self-defense in other jurisdictions).
11. See discussion infra part II.A (identifying the three most significant problems with Illinois'
current approach to this issue).
12. See discussion infra part II.B (considering the advantages and disadvantages of the alter-
native rules that Illinois could adopt).
13. See discussion infra parts II.C, III (concluding that Illinois needs to narrow its overly
broad rule on admissibility with respect to this type of evidence).
14. See discussion infra part II.C (discussing this Comment's proposed statute).
1996]
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Character Evidence and the Claim of Self-Defense
Character can be defined as the "nature of a person, his disposition
generally, or his disposition in respect to a particular trait such as hon-
esty, peacefulness or truthfulness."' 5 A defendant charged with a vio-
lent crime who asserts self-defense 16 may offer evidence of a victim's
violent character to prove two separate and distinct evidentiary
propositions.17
First, the defendant may offer evidence of the victim's violent char-
acter to prove the defendant's state of mind, i.e., that he was afraid of
the victim,1 8 during the incident in question. By proving that he was
afraid of the victim, the defendant can establish that the degree of
force used was reasonable. 19 Evidence of the victim's violent charac-
ter is relevant because the defendant's knowledge of the victim's vio-
lent tendencies affects his "perceptions of and reactions to the victim's
behavior. '20 The defendant offers this evidence to prove that the de-
gree of force used was reasonable under the circumstances even
though such force may have been unreasonable if used against an or-
dinarily peaceful person.2'
15. GRAHAM, supra note 1, § 404.
16. In Illinois, the affirmative defense of self-defense is governed by section 5/7-1 of the Crim-
inal Code of 1961. 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (1994). In People v. Booker, the court explained:
The use of deadly force in self-defense is justified when the defendant is not the aggres-
sor and the defendant reasonably believes that he is threatened with force which will
cause death or great bodily harm and the danger of harm is imminent. The amount of
forced used must be necessary to avert the danger.
People v. Booker, 653 N.E.2d 952, 954 (II1. App. Ct. 1995) (citations omitted).
17. People v. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d 1018, 1020 (II1. 1984); People v. Ciavirelli, 635 N.E.2d 610,
614-15 (II1. App. Ct. 1994); People v. Crum, 539 N.E.2d 196, 203 (11. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 545
N.E.2d 118 (Ill. 1989); People v. Berry, 529 N.E.2d 1001, 1006 (I11. App. Ct. 1988); People v.
Johnson, 526 N.E.2d 611, 615 (Il1. App. Ct. 1988); People v. Gossett, 451 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983); People v. Buchanan, 414 N.E.2d 262, 264 (II1. App. Ct. 1980); People v. Meares,
403 N.E.2d 547, 553 (11. App. Ct. 1980); accord State v. Miranda, 405 A.2d 622, 623 (Conn.
1978); Hemingway v. State, 543 A.2d 879, 881 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); State v. Howell, 649
P.2d 91, 96 (Utah 1982).
18. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d at 1020; Ciavirelli, 635 N.E.2d at 614-15; Berry, 529 N.E.2d at 1006;
Crum, 539 N.E.2d at 203; Johnson, 526 N.E.2d at 615; Gossett, 451 N.E.2d at 286; Buchanan, 414
N.E.2d at 264; Meares, 403 N.E.2d at 553; People v. Adams, 388 N.E.2d 1326, 1329-30 (II1. App.
Ct. 1979); accord Miranda, 405 A.2d at 623; Hemingway, 543 A.2d at 881; Howell, 649 P.2d at 96.
Specifically, the Lynch court stated that "the defendant's knowledge of the victim's violent
tendencies necessarily affects his perceptions of and reactions to the victim's behavior." Lynch,
470 N.E.2d at 1020.
19. E.g., Lynch, 470 N.E.2d at 1020.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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The second purpose for which a defendant may offer evidence of
the victim's violent character is to prove circumstantially that the vic-
tim was the aggressor where there is a factual dispute as to whether
the defendant or the victim was the aggressor.2 2 Proof of the victim's
violent character permits the inference that the victim acted in con-
formity with his own character on the particular occasion in ques-
tion.23 Arguably, this evidence is relevant because it tends to support
the defendant's version of the facts. 24
1. Methods for Proving a Victim's Violent Character
In Illinois, a defendant may attempt to prove a victim's violent char-
acter by using two distinct methods: (1) evidence of the victim's repu-
tation, or (2) evidence of specific acts of violence committed by the
victim. 25
22. People v. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d 1018, 1020 (Il. 1984); People v. Ciavirelli, 635 N.E.2d 610,
614-15 (II. App. Ct. 1994); People v. Lovelace, 622 N.E.2d 859, 869 (Il. App. Ct. 1993); People
v. Agee, 562 N.E.2d 545, 547-48 (Il. App. Ct. 1990); People v. Crum, 539 N.E.2d 196, 203 (I11.
App. Ct.), cert. denied, 545 N.E.2d 118 (I1. 1989); People v. Berry, 529 N.E.2d 1001, 1006 (I1.
App. Ct. 1988); People v. Castiglione, 501 N.E.2d 923, 930 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 508
N.E.2d 731 (Ill. 1987); People v. Gossett, 451 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); People v.
Johnson, 526 N.E.2d 611, 615 (11. App. Ct. 1988); People v. Buchanan, 414 N.E.2d 262, 264 (I11.
App. Ct. 1980); People v. Meares, 403 N.E.2d 547, 553 (11. App. Ct. 1980); People v. Montgom-
ery, 366 N.E.2d 623, 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); People v. Baer, 342 N.E.2d 177, 181 (Il. App. Ct.
1976); accord State v. Miranda, 405 A.2d 622, 623 (Conn. 1978); Hemingway v. State, 543 A.2d
879, 881 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 96 (Utah 1982); cf. Meyer v.
City & County of Honolulu, 731 P.2d 149, 150 (Haw. 1986) (allowing the defendant to introduce
evidence of the plaintiffs prior acts of violence in a civil assault and battery case where there was
an issue as to who the aggressor was); People v. Harris, 587 N.E.2d 47, 49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(holding that "it is well-settled that when a theory of self-defense is raised in a battery case,
evidence of the peaceful or violent character of either the victim or the accused may be relevant
as circumstantial evidence to show which party was the initial aggressor) (emphasis added). See
generally JOHN H. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW 1395 (Tillers rev. 1983)
(stating that "the most frequent use of character evidence against a victim is when a violent
crime is charged, to show that the victim was the first aggressor").
23. WiGMoRE, supra note 22, at 1350.
24. GRAHAM, supra note 1, § 404.4.
25. Id. In addition, the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for a third method of proving an
individual's character, namely, by offering the opinion of a witness. FED. R. EviD. 405(a). This
method represents a departure from the traditional methods of proving character established at
common law. GRAHAM, supra note 1, § 405.2 (quoting Federal Advisory Committee's Note, 56
F.R.D. 183, 222 (1973)). However, Illinois does not permit character to be proved by opinion
evidence. Id. Further discussion of the use of opinion evidence in this context is beyond the
scope of this article.
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a. Reputation Evidence
A defendant may attempt to prove a victim's violent character by
offering evidence of the victim's reputation for violence.26 A person's
reputation can be defined as the "community estimate of him."' 27 The
relevant community may be where the individual works, studies, or
performs some other type of community activity.28 The testifying
character witness need not personally know the individual in question;
rather, the witness need only be familiar with the individual's reputa-
tion in the relevant community.29
Reputation evidence is the most well-established method of proving
an individual's character.30 It is also generally regarded as less relia-
ble than other methods. 31 Nevertheless, the courts have traditionally
favored reputation evidence over specific act evidence because repu-
tation evidence "takes little time to present and (in contrast to specific
instances) is unlikely to divert the trial to disputes over collateral
matters." 32
In Illinois, evidence of a victim's reputation for violence is admissi-
ble to prove that the defendant reasonably feared the victim, provided
that the defendant knew of the victim's reputation at the time of the
altercation.33 However, regardless of whether the defendant knew of
26. GRAHAM, supra note 1, § 405.1; e.g., Crum, 539 N.E.2d at 203 (admitting evidence that the
victim "had a violent nature" in order to prove the victim's violent character); Buchanan, 414
N.E.2d at 264 (stating that the defendant may offer evidence of the victim's reputation for vio-
lence in order to prove that the victim was the aggressor); Meares, 403 N.E.2d at 553 (stating that
where character is at issue, the individual's character can only be proven by reputation
evidence).
27. GRAHAM, supra note 1, § 404.1.
28. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 249 (Little, Brown &
Co. 1995); accord GRAHAM supra note 1, § 405.1.
29. GRAHAM, supra note 1, § 405.1; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 28, at 249.
30. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 28, at 249.
31. Id. (citing H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct. Illusion, Illogic,
and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 885 (1982) (arguing that reputation
evidence should be disallowed because it is the least trustworthy and least testable form of char-
acter evidence)); see infra note 37 and accompanying text (noting that specific act evidence is
more reliable than reputation evidence because it is "more objective and fact oriented" than
reputation evidence).
32. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 28, at 249.
33. See, e.g., People v. McGee, 572 N.E.2d 1046, 1053-54 (Ill. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 580
N.E.2d 127 (Ill. 1991) (holding that evidence that the victim, unknown to the defendant, was a
violent person was irrelevant to the defendant's claim that the degree of force he used was
reasonable); People v. Crum, 539 N.E.2d 196,203 (II1. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 545 N.E.2d 118 (Il1.
1989) (admitting evidence that proved that the defendant knew that the victim "had a violent
nature" because the evidence was "relevant to show defendant's state of mind"); People v. Ware,
536 N.E.2d 713, 717 (I11. App. Ct. 1988) (stating that the defendant must have had knowledge of
the victim's character and reputation in order to prove "the reasonableness of the defendant's
state of mind in acting in self-defense"); People v. Johnson, 526 N.E.2d 611, 615 (Ill. App. Ct.
[Vol. 46:183
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the victim's reputation, reputation evidence is admissible to prove cir-
cumstantially that the victim, acting in conformity with his character,
was the aggressor during the incident in question. 34
b. Specific Act Evidence
A defendant also may attempt to prove a victim's violent character
by offering evidence of a specific act of violence committed by the
victim. 35 Specific act evidence ranges from prior felony convictions to
general bad acts committed by the victim. 36
1988) (holding that the trial court properly excluded a witness' testimony that the victim "was
known as a 'bully"' which was offered to prove the defendant's state of mind because there was
no evidence that the defendant was aware of the victim's reputation); People v. Buchanan, 414
N.E.2d 262, 264 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (noting that if the defendant offers evidence of the victim's
character or reputation to prove that the defendant was afraid of the victim, the defendant must
have been aware of the substance of the evidence at the time of the incident in question); see
People v. Vega, 437 N.E.2d 919, 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (finding that the trial court properly
excluded evidence of the victim's arrest record where the defendant had claimed knowledge of
the victim's trouble with the police, but not of his arrest record).
34. See, e.g., Ware, 536 N.E.2d at 717 ("A requirement that the defendant knew of the de-
ceased's propensity for violence is unrelated" to his "assertion that the victim was the initial
aggressor where there are conflicting accounts of the incident."); Buchanan, 414 N.E.2d at 264
(noting that if the defendant offers evidence of the victim's character of reputation to prove that
the victim was the aggressor, there is no requirement that the defendant must have been aware
of the evidence at the time of the incident in question).
35. GiRumA, supra note 1, § 404.4; e.g., People v. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d 1018 (Il1. 1984) (holding
that three prior convictions for battery are relevant); People v. Devine, 557 N.E.2d 953, 956 (Ill.
App. Ct.), cert. denied, 575 N.E.2d 918 (11. 1991) (noting that the trial court had allowed the
defendant to attempt to prove that the victim was the aggressor by introducing evidence of the
victim's prior misdemeanor conviction, testimony that the victim had carried a gun on occasion,
that the victim became violent when on cocaine, and that the victim had once shot an old boy-
friend); Crum, 539 N.E.2d at 203 (admitting evidence that proved that the victim "always carried
a gun" because the evidence was relevant to show the defendant's state of mind); People v.
Adams, 388 N.E.2d 1326, 1329-30 (Il1. App. Ct. 1979) (concluding that "specific acts of violence
.on the part of the [victim], if known to the defendant, are admissible to show the reasonableness
of the defendant's apprehension of danger"); People v. Baer, 342 N.E.2d 177, 181 (Il1. App. Ct.
1976) (stating that specific prior incidents of violent aggression by the victim may be admissible
as tending to show that he was the aggressor in the incident); People v. Stombaugh, 284 N.E.2d
640, 645 (11. 1972) (noting that in a homicide case, where the defendant asserts self-defense and
presents evidence that the victim was the assailant, the defendant must be given substantial lati-
tude in introducing evidence of the victim's propensity for violence because the evidence tends
to show the defendant's state of mind at the time of the incident in question); cf People v.
Robinson, 516 N.E.2d 1292, 1306 (Il. App. Ct. 1987), cert. denied, 522 N.E.2d 1292 (II. 1988)
("[E]vidence of [an uncommunicated] threat by a third person is admissible as tending to show
that the victim or the third person was the aggressor, and that the defendant acted in self-de-
fense, where it is shown that the victim and the third person conspired or acted together against
the defendant.").
36. See, e.g., Lynch, 470 N.E.2d at 1020-21 (discussing specific act evidence in the form of
three prior battery convictions); People v. Clarke, 612 N.E.2d 1351, 1354-55 (Ill. App. Ct.), cert.
denied, 622 N.E.2d 1213 (I1. 1993) (discussing specific act evidence in the form of evidence that
the victim had once bumped another's car three times from behind); Devine, 557 N.E.2d at 956-
57 (noting that the trial court had allowed the defendant to attempt to prove that the victim was
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Arguably, specific act evidence is more reliable than reputation evi-
dence to establish the victim's violent character because specific act
evidence is "more objective and fact-oriented. ' 37 However, specific
act evidence also "possesses the greatest capacity to arouse prejudice,
to confuse, to surprise, and to consume time. ' 38 Thus, due to prejudi-
cial and systemic concerns, Illinois courts generally follow the rule
that specific act evidence is not admissible to prove an individual's
character.39 An exception to this general rule is that, when a defend-
ant asserts self-defense, specific act evidence that is probative of the
victim's violent character might be admissible to prove either that the
defendant was acting out of fear of the victim or that the victim was
the aggressor.40
the aggressor by introducing evidence of the victim's prior misdemeanor conviction, and testi-
mony that the victim had carried a gun on occasion, that the victim became a violent person
when on cocaine, and that the victim had once shot at an old boyfriend); Crum, 539 N.E.2d at
203 (holding that the trial court improperly excluded evidence that the victim had pulled a gun
on one or more individuals which the defendant offered to prove that the victim was the aggres-
sor in the incident in question); People v. Hanson, 485 N.E.2d 1144, 1149-50 (111. App. Ct. 1985)
(holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it prevented the defendant from
presenting two witnesses who would have testified that the victim had threatened a person with a
knife at a tavern and another witness who would have testified that the victim threatened "him
and his wife when [the victim] felt the witness had run his car off the road" because this evidence
was "relevant to who was the aggressor"). Contra People v. Loggins, 629 N.E.2d 137, 143-44 (III.
App. Ct. 1993) (finding that the trial court properly precluded the defendant from asking
whether the victim had been "seen to get aggressive" because the question did not properly
identify any specific prior act of violence); People v. Costillo, 608 N.E.2d 100, 107 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (holding that the victim's arrest for unlawful possession of a weapon without evidence that
the victim brandished the weapon or used it in any way does not indicate that the victim was a
violent person); People v. Ellis, 543 N.E.2d 196, 200 (III. App. Ct. 1989), cert. denied, 553 N.E.2d
398 (I11.), and cert. denied, 498 U.S. 942 (1990) (holding that the trial court properly excluded
evidence of the victim's prior arrests because "evidence of a victim's mere arrest" is inadmissible
since it does not indicate whether the victim actually performed any of the acts charged); People
v. Ware, 536 N.E.2d 713, 717-18 (I1. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that evidence of a psychiatric report
taken of the victim twelve days after the incident in question was not relevant to prove that the
victim had been the aggressor); People v. Huddleston, 530 N.E.2d 1015, 1022 (II. App. Ct. 1988)
(holding that the trial court properly excluded testimony that the victim had once been arrested
for battery since the "testimony could not establish that the decedent had a violent character").
37. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 28, at 251; see also FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory
committee's note (explaining that "[o]f the three methods of proving character provided by the
rule, evidence of specific instances of conduct is the most convincing").
38. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note.
39. See GRAHAM, supra note 1, § 404.4 (citing People v. Allen, 124 N.E. 329 (Ill. 1919); People
v. Jiminez, 452 N.E.2d 40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)).
40. People v. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d 1018, 1020 (Ill. 1984); People v. Ciavirelli, 635 N.E.2d 610,
614-15 (II. App. Ct. 1994); People v. Lovelace, 622 N.E.2d 859, 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); People
v. Harris, 587 N.E.2d 47, 49 (I1. App. Ct. 1992); People v. Agee, 562 N.E.2d 545, 547-48 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990); People v. Crum, 539 N.E.2d 196, 203 (11. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 545 N.E.2d 118
(Ill. 989); People v. Berry, 529 N.E.2d 1001, 1006 (I1. App. Ct. 1988); People v. Johnson, 526
N.E.2d 611. 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); People v. Gossett, 451 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983);
People v. Buchanan, 414 N.E.2d 262,264 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); People v. Meares, 403 N.E.2d 547,
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First, a defendant may attempt to present evidence of specific acts
of violence committed by the victim to prove that the defendant was
afraid of the victim and, consequently, that the degree of force used
was reasonable.41 In order to use specific act evidence for this pur-
pose, most courts hold that the defendant must have had knowledge
of these instances at the time of the incident in question. 42 Without
such knowledge, the victim's violent character could not have affected
553 (I11. App. Ct. 1980); People v. Montgomery, 366 N.E.2d 623, 628 (I11. App. Ct. 1977); People
v. Baer, 342 N.E.2d 177, 181 (I11. App. Ct. 1976); accord State v. Miranda, 405 A.2d 622, 623
(Conn. 1978); Meyer v. City & County of Honolulu, 731 P.2d 149, 150 (Haw. 1986) (allowing the
defendant to introduce evidence of the plaintiff's prior acts of violence in a civil assault and
battery case where there was an issue as to who the aggressor was); Hemingway v. State, 543
A.2d 879, 881 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 96 (Utah 1982); cf. People
v. Harris, 587 N.E.2d 47, 49 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that "it is well-settled that when a
theory of self-defense is raised in a battery case, evidence of the peaceful or violent character of
either the victim or the accused may be relevant as circumstantial evidence to show which party
was the initial aggressor") (emphasis added); People v. Castiglione, 501 N.E.2d 923, 930 (II1.
App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 508 N.E.2d 731 (III. 1987) (holding that the defendant was not
allowed to offer in evidence of the victim's prior convictions because the evidence showed that
another individual, who was not the victim or the defendant, was the aggressor). See generally
WiGMORE, supra note 22, at 1395 (stating that "the most frequent use of character evidence
against a victim is when a violent crime is charged, to show that the victim was the first
aggressor").
41. E.g., Lynch, 470 N.E.2d at 1020 (stating that "[tihe same deadly force that would be unrea-
sonable in an altercation with a presumably peaceful citizen may be reasonable in response to
similar behavior by a man of known violent and aggressive tendencies").
42. Id. ("One can only consider facts one knows, however, and evidence of the victim's char-
acter is irrelevant to this theory of self-defense unless the defendant knew of the victim's violent
nature); Ciavirelli, 635 N.E.2d at 615 (noting that the defendant must have been aware of the
victim's prior acts of violence in order for those acts to have affected the defendant's state of
mind); Crum, 539 N.E.2d at 203 (admitting evidence that proved that the defendant knew that
the victim "always carried a gun" because the evidence was "relevant to show the defendant's
state of mind"); People v. Adams, 388 N.E.2d 1326, 1329-30 (I11. App. Ct. 1979) (concluding that
"specific acts of violence on the part of the [victim], if known to the defendant, are admissible to
show the reasonableness of the defendant's apprehension of danger"); cf. People v. McGee, 572
N.E.2d 1046, 1053-54 (Ill. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 580 N.E.2d 127 (I11. 1991) (holding that evi-
dence that the victim, unknown to the defendant, was a violent person was irrelevant to the
defendant's claim that the degree of force he used was reasonable); People v. Smith, 491 N.E.2d
128, 131 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) (finding that evidence that the victim had repeatedly raped the
defendant's daughter at gunpoint did not support the defendant's self-defense claim because the
rape occurred after the offenses for which the defendant was charged); People v. Vega, 437
N.E.2d 919, 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (finding that the trial court properly excluded evidence of
the victim's arrest record (criminal damage to property, burglary, fighting, reckless driving, un-
lawful possession of cannabis, battery, and aggravated battery) where the defendant had claimed
knowledge of the victim's trouble with the police, but not his arrest record). But see People v.
Davidson, 601 N.E.2d 1146, 1149-50 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (stating that specific act evidence is
admissible to prove that the defendant used reasonable force regardless of whether the defend-
ant knew of the acts at the time of the incident in question); Hemingway, 543 A.2d at 881 (stating
that the defendant must have been aware of the victim's past acts in order for those acts to have
affected the defendant's state of mind).
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the defendant's state of mind.43 If, however, a defendant knows at the
time of the incident in question that the victim has a violent disposi-
tion, this knowledge would go directly to the defendant's state of mind
and, correspondingly, to the reasonableness of his actions.44
Illinois courts have consistently held that evidence of specific vio-
lent acts committed by the victim, of which the defendant was aware
at the time of the altercation, is admissible to prove that the defendant
was afraid of the victim. 45 The commonly cited purpose behind admit-
ting such evidence is "to show the circumstances confronting the de-
fendant, the extent of his apparent danger, and the motive by which
he was influenced, as such factors show the defendant's state of mind
at the time of the occurrence." 46
Alternatively, the defendant may offer specific act evidence in an
effort to prove that the victim was the initial aggressor.47 Evidence
admitted for this purpose attempts to prove circumstantially that the
victim was the aggressor through the inference that the victim was
acting in accordance with his violent character during the incident in
43. See, e.g., Vega, 437 N.E.2d at 921 (holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence
of the victim's arrest record where the defendant had no knowledge of its contents and the
defendant was attempting to prove that he was afraid of the victim).
44. See, e.g., People v. Stombaugh, 284 N.E.2d 640, 645 (Il1. 1972) (stating that the defendant
should be given "substantial latitude" in presenting state-of-mind evidence); Adams, 388 N.E.2d
at 1329-30 ("We conclude that specific acts of violence on the part of the deceased, if known to
the defendant, are admissible to show the reasonableness of the defendant's apprehension of
danger."). But see People v. Wood, 471 N.E.2d 1060, 1062 (II1. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that
evidence of an earlier, unrelated beating suffered by the defendant that arguably affected his
state of mind at the time of the offense at issue was properly excluded on grounds that the
evidence was irrelevant and would serve to distract the jury).
45. See, e.g., Ciavirelli, 635 N.E.2d at 614-15 (explaining that the defendant must have been
aware of the victim's prior violent acts in order for those acts to have affected the defendant's
state of mind); People v. Fischer, 426 N.E.2d 965, 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (stating that "[i]n
Illinois, evidence of specific acts of violence, if known to the defendant are admissible to show
the reasonableness of defendant's apprehension of danger and therefore are admissible to estab-
lish self defense" (citing People v. Gall, 398 N.E.2d 1118 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979))).
46. Fischer, 426 N.E.2d at 968; accord Stombaugh, 284 N.E.2d at 645; Gal, 398 N.E.2d at 1121-
22; People v. Peeler, 299 N.E.2d 382, 386 (II1. App. Ct. 1973).
47. GRAHAM, supra note 1, § 404,4; cf. People v. Robinson, 516 N.E.2d 1292, 1306 (I11. App.
Ct. 1987), cert. denied, 522 N.E.2d 1292 (Ill. 1988) ("[E]vidence of [an uncommunicated] threat
by a third person is admissible as tending to show that the victim or the third person was the
aggressor, and that the defendant acted in self-defense, where it is shown that the victim and the
third person conspired or acted together against the defendant."); People v. Castiglione, 501
N.E.2d 923, 930 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 508 N.E.2d 731 (II. 1987) (holding that the
defendant was not allowed to offer in evidence of the victim's prior convictions because the
evidence showed that another individual who was not the victim or the defendant, was the
aggressor).
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question.4 8 Admissibility for this purpose is not dependent upon
whether the defendant was aware of the instances at the time of the
altercation. 49
In contrast to Illinois, the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the
defendant from using specific act evidence to prove that the victim
was the aggressor;50 rather, the Federal Rules limit the defendant to
the use of reputation and opinion testimony.51 The majority of state
jurisdictions follow this approach.5 2 Illinois and a minority of jurisdic-
tions, however, permit the accused to prove that the victim was the
aggressor by specific act evidence. 53 The different treatment between
48. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 147 (3d ed. 1995) ("The log-
ical relevance is that if the alleged victim has a violent personality, that personality increases the
probability that the alleged victim threw the first punch and was the aggressor.").
49. People v. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d 1018,1020 (Ill. 1984); People v. Ciavirelli, 635 N.E.2d 610, 615
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (stating that a victim's prior incidents of violence, including those which
postdated the event in question, may still be relevant to support the defendant's contentions as
to who was the aggressor where there are conflicting accounts of what happened); People v.
Crum, 539 N.E.2d 196, 203 (I11. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 545 N.E.2d 118 (Ill. 1989) (holding that
the trial court improperly excluded evidence that the victim had pulled a gun on one or more
individuals which the defendant offered to prove that the victim was the aggressor in the incident
in question); People v. Gossett, 451 N.E.2d 280, 284-86 (Il1. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that the trial
court erred in excluding evidence of specific acts of violence committed by the homicide victim
"which were not directed at the defendant and of which the defendant had no knowledge at the
time of the incident"); People v. Buchanan, 414 N.E.2d 262, 264 (Il1. App. Ct. 1980) (noting that
if the defendant offers evidence of the victim's character or reputation to prove that the victim
was the aggressor, there is no requirement that the defendant must have been aware of the
information at the time of the incident in question); cf. People v. Lovelace, 622 N.E.2d 859, 869
(I1l. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that the evidence which is offered must "make the proposition that
the victim was the aggressor more probable").
50. Rule 405(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
In all cases in which evidence of character or trait of character of a person is admissible,
proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an
opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of
conduct.
FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
51. Id.
52. See infra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing the approach in the majority of
jurisdictions).
53. See infra notes 217-21 and accompanying text (discussing the approach in the minority of
jurisdictions). The jurisdictions that have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence and allow in
specific act evidence to prove that the victim was the aggressor usually admit such evidence
under their counterpart to Rule 405(b). See, e.g., James A. Adams, Admissibility of Proof of an
Assault Victim's Specific Instances of Conduct as an Essential Element of a Self-Defense Claim
Under Iowa Rule of Evidence 405, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 401, 411-17 (1990) (discussing Iowa's
statutory and judicial interpretation of Federal Rule 405(b)); Mark R. Horton, Note, Whether a
Defendant's Claim of Victim Aggressiveness Is an "Essential Element" of the Defense of Self-
Defense: State v. Baca I & II, 24 N.M. L. REV. 449, 451-53 (1994) (discussing the application of
New Mexico's interpretation of Evidence Rule 405(b)). Federal Rule 405(b) provides: "In cases
in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a ... defense,
proof may also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct." FED. R. EVID. 405(b).
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the majority and minority positions is attributable to the strong policy
arguments that support both positions.54
2. Specific Act Evidence: Policies For and Against Admissibility
Courts and commentators have articulated five general arguments
that support limiting the method of establishing a victim's violent
character to proof of reputation.5 5 These arguments focus on the pro-
bative value of such evidence, the prejudicial effects of admitting spe-
cific act evidence, and the systemic concerns involved in admitting
such evidence.56
The first of the five policy arguments focuses on the minimal proba-
tive value of such evidence. The argument is that the probative value
of specific act evidence is minimal because "a single prior act of the
decedent may have been exceptional, unusual and not characteristic,
i.e., a specific prior act would not show a character trait to commit an
act or to react in a certain way."'57
In Hirschman v. People,58 the Illinois Supreme Court argued that
the method of establishing character for the purpose of proving that
the victim was the aggressor should be limited to reputation evidence
due to the weak probative value of specific act evidence. 59 The court
stated,
[I]t is general character alone which can afford any test of general
conduct, or raise a presumption that the person who had maintained
a fair reputation down to a certain period, would not begin to act an
54. See discussion infra part I.A.2 (discussing the policy arguments in favor of both admitting
and excluding specific act evidence in this context).
55. See, e.g., People v. Fischer, 426 N.E.2d 965, 971-72 (II1. App. Ct. 1981) (Rizzi, J., concur-
ring) (discussing the arguments for excluding such evidence); State v. Jacoby, 260 N.W.2d 828,
838 (Iowa 1977); State v. Waller, 816 S.W.2d 212, 214-15 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (discussing the
five key policy reasons for prohibiting the admission of specific act evidence); State v. Duncan,
467 S.W.2d 866, 867-68 (Mo. 1971); State v. Tribble, 428 A.2d 1079, 1084 (R.I. 1981) (citing the
most common arguments in support of excluding such evidence); WiGMoRE, supra note 22,
§ 54.1; James L. Kainen, Character Evidence, 11 TouRo L. Rav. 11, 17-18 (1994); Horton, supra
note 53, at 456-57.
56. See, e.g., Fischer, 426 N.E.2d at 971-72 (Rizzi, J., concurring) ("[lit has been stated that
proving a character trait by evidence of specific instances of conduct 'possesses the greatest
capacity to arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to consume time."' (quoting State v.
Jacoby, 260 N.W.2d 828, 838 (Iowa 1977))).
57. Id. at 971; accord Henderson v. State, 218 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1975); Jacoby, 260 N.W.2d
at 838; Waller, 816 S.W.2d at 214 ("A single act may have been exceptional, unusual and un-
characteristic; an isolated episode does not provide a true picture of the character of a person.");
Duncan, 467 S.W.2d at 867-68; Tribble, 428 A.2d at 1084 (citing the most common arguments in
support of excluding such evidence, one of which is the minimal probative value of the evi-
dence); Horton, supra note 53, at 456 (citing Waller).
58. 101 111. 568 (1882).
59. Id. at 574.
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unworthy part, and, therefore, proof of particular transactions, in
which the prisoner may have been concerned, are not admissible.60
Thus, the Hirschman court explained that proof of one's general char-
acter might be sufficient to raise the presumption that one behaved in
conformity with his character during the incident in question; how-
ever, proof of prior bad acts is insufficient to raise such a presumption
and, thus, is not admissible. 61
The second argument focuses on the potentially unduly prejudicial
nature of such evidence. Courts and commentators have argued that,
in essence, juries would be invited to find for defendants on the
ground that "the victim was a violent person and deserved to die."'62
The fear is that the jury might misuse the evidence and acquit the
defendant based on the notion that the victim "got what he deserved,"
regardless of whether the victim was actually the aggressor.63
Considering the two arguments explained above, a concurring jus-
tice in the case of People v. Fischer64 argued that, based on the weak
probative value and the highly prejudicial impact that specific act evi-
dence has, Illinois courts should apply the following rule when deter-
mining the admissibility of such evidence:
If the evidence is offered by the defendant as a character trait of the
decedent to show that the decedent was the aggressor, then the rep-
utation of the decedent for turbulence and violence is admissible.
This evidence would be admissible even if the defendant had not
known of the decedent's reputation at the time. However, specific
prior acts of turbulence and violence by the decedent would not be
admissible whether or not known by the defendant at the time.65
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Chandler v. State, 405 S.E.2d 669, 675 (Ga. 1991) (Benham, J., concurring)
(warning that juries would be invited to find for defendants on the ground that "the victim was a
violent person and deserved to die"); Heidel v. State, 587 So. 2d 835, 846 (Miss. 1991) (stating
that "in the case of a man on trial for assault, the prosecution may not prove that the man
assaulted another two weeks earlier" because the prejudicial effect of such evidence outweighs
the probative value and that the same view of jury psychology also supports precluding the
defendant from offering in similar evidence with respect to the victim); accord State v. Dallas,
710 P.2d 580, 589 (Idaho 1985) (noting that Idaho prohibits the accused from introducing specific
instances of the victim's conduct in order to support the inference that the victim was the first
aggressor because the "bad character of the deceased is likely to be thought of by the jury as an
excuse for the killing"); Horton, supra note 53, at 457-58 (citing Chandler, 405 S.E.2d at 675).
63. Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for
the Second Decade, 70 MirN. L. REv. 763, 782 (1986); accord Dallas, 710 P.2d at 589 ("Learning
of the victim's bad character could lead the jury to conclude that the victim merely 'got what he
deserved' and to acquit for that reason.").
64. 426 N.E.2d 965 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (Rizzi, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 970.
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The third argument supporting inadmissibility addresses the sys-
temic concern of wasting time by creating a trial within a trial. Admit-
ting specific act evidence might open up numerous collateral issues
and possibly create a mini-trial out of each separate instance to deter-
mine what really occurred.66 The contention is that the victim's char-
acter itself is not an element of the crime or defense; rather, it is
merely circumstantial evidence of whether the victim was the aggres-
sor.67 Allowing the jury to focus on these collateral issues could result
in mini-trials, thereby resulting in a tremendous waste of judicial time
and resources. 68
In addition to wasting time, "[clollateral issues might cloud the real
issues and confuse the jury. '69 Ultimately, the jury must decide "how
the defendant and victim behaved on this [particular] occasion, not
whether the victim . . . had a character . . . for aggression or
violence. "70
The fourth rationale is that "It]he state cannot anticipate and pre-
pare to rebut every specific prior act of violence of a... victim." '7 1
Requiring the prosecution to be prepared to litigate any prior bad act
places an unjustifiable burden on the prosecution. 72 Allowing the de-
66. See People v. Fischer, 426 N.E.2d 965, 971 (III. App. Ct. 1981) (Rizzi, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that "permitting proof of specific prior acts of the decedent to show that he acted a certain
way during the incident involved in the case on trial would open up numerous collateral issues,
virtually making a separate trial out of each separate act"); see also State v. Waller, 816 S.W.2d
212, 214 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) ("Numerous collateral issues could be raised, resulting in a
lengthy trial."); State v. Tribble, 428 A.2d 1079, 1084 (R.I. 1981) (citing the most common argu-
ments in support of excluding specific act evidence); Kainen, supra note 55, at 17-18 (arguing
that "the low probative value of [specific act evidence] weighed against its potential for prejudice
and confusion of the issue by raising a collateral matter justifies New York's rule of exclusion"
(citing Williams v. Lord, 996 F.2d 1481 (2d Cir. 1993))); Horton supra note 53, at 456 (citing
Waller).
67. Kainen, supra note 55, at 17.
68. Fischer, 426 N.E.2d at 971; Horton, supra note 53, at 456.
69. Horton, supra note 53, at 456 (citing Waller, 816 S.W.2d at 214); accord Tribble, 428 A.2d
at 1084; Kainen, supra note 55, at 17; cf. Howell, 649 P.2d at 96 (noting that Utah only allows a
victim's violent character to be proven by reputation evidence and evidence of prior criminal
convictions in order "[t]o prevent the trial from being drawn into pathways collateral to the
central issue of guilt"). But cf. State v. Miranda, 405 A.2d 622, 624-25 (Conn. 1978) (allowing
specific instances of conduct only in the form of a prior conviction, noting that the introduction
of the victim's criminal record is not likely to confuse the jury or waste time).
70. Kainen, supra note 55, at 12.
71. Waller, 816 S.W.2d at 215; accord Miranda, 405 A.2d at 623 (allowing specific instances of
conduct only in the form of a prior conviction, noting "[t]hat a homicide victim had a record of
violent crime should not come as a surprise to the prosecution"); Fischer, 426 N.E.2d at 971
(Rizzi, J., concurring) (explaining that "although the State is bound to foresee that the reputa-
tion of the decedent may be put in issue, it cannot be expected to anticipate and prepare to rebut
each and every specific prior act of the decedent"); Horton, supra note 53, at 456 (citing Waller).
72. Fischer, 426 N.E.2d at 971.
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fendant to introduce evidence of prior bad acts committed by the vic-
tim, without advance notice to the state, could result in unfairness to
the state due to the element of surprise.73 In addition, evidence of
prior bad acts, as opposed to prior convictions, is susceptible to exag-
gerated or "fabricated testimony by the defendant and defense wit-
nesses concerning the [victim's] propensity for violence. '74
Finally, some courts and commentators argue that the court should
not allow the defendant to introduce evidence of the victim's past acts
of violence since the state is not allowed to offer similar evidence rela-
tive to the defendant's prior bad acts.75 Allowing the defendant to
offer such evidence while precluding the state from doing so "creates
a double standard favorable to the defendant." 76
Strong policy arguments also support the position that specific act
evidence should be admissible to prove that the victim was the aggres-
sor. Supporters of admissibility similarly focus on the probative value,
prejudicial impact and systemic concerns associated with such
evidence.
First, supporters argue that specific act evidence is highly probative
because an individual's past behavior is often the best indicator of his
future behavior.77 In fact, the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee's Notes state that "specific instances of conduct is the
most convincing" method of proving character.78
In addition to its probative value, courts and commentators argue
that specific act evidence should be admissible when offered by the
defendant because there is a "constitutional imperative to preserve a
defendant's right to present [an adequate] defense." 79 Specific act evi-
dence is usually inadmissible against a defendant to prove the offense
73. Chandler v. State, 405 S.E.2d 669, 674 (Ga. 1991) (imposing a requirement that the de-
fendant notify the trial court prior to trial of his intention to introduce such evidence in order to
avoid unfair "surprise" to the state).
74. Galvin, supra note 63, at 782.
75. Waller, 816 S.W.2d at 215; Horton, supra note 53, at 456 (citing Waller). But see Joan L.
Larsen, Of Propensity, Prejudice, and Plain Meaning: The Accused's Use of Exculpatory Specific
Acts Evidence and the Need to Amend Rule 404(b), 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 651, 653 (1993) (arguing
"that there is a fundamental difference in the effect of specific acts evidence when it is offered by
the state and when offered by the accused" and, thus, that the accused should not be prohibited
from introducing such evidence).
76. Waller, 816 S.W.2d at 215; Horton, supra note 53, at 456 (citing Waller).
77. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 75, at 655 ("This premise is based on the reasoning, so in-
grained in our collective intuition and common sense, that an individual's past behavior is often
the best predictor of her future behavior.").
78. FED. R. EvrD. 405 advisory committee's notes.
79. See Horton, supra note 53, at 457 (arguing that the "courts must weigh the constitutional
imperative to preserve a defendant's right to present a defense" against the danger of "acquittals
based on antipathy for the victim").
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charged since potential for prejudice substantially outweighs the pro-
bative value of such evidence where the defendant's life or liberty is at
stake.80 However, where the victim's violent character is at issue, "the
danger of prejudice to the defendant lies in refusing to admit such
evidence, while its high degree of relevance and reliability remains
constant."8'
Finally, courts and commentators argue that the systemic concerns
voiced by supporters of inadmissibility are unfounded. First, support-
ers state that "there is no basis for the . . . argument that the jury
might acquit a guilty person because it perceives the third party,
against whom the specific acts evidence is introduced, as a bad person
deserving of punishment. ' '82 In addition, supporters contend that the
argument that this type of evidence should not be admissible because
it might confuse or mislead the jury proceeds "from the mistaken and,
indeed, entirely unempirical assumption that modern juries . . . are
'bereft of educated and intelligent persons who can be expected to
apply their ordinary judgment and practical experience.' ' 83
As the above discussion demonstrates, strong policy arguments
favor both positions. The next section will trace the development of
the Illinois rule with respect to the admissibility of specific act evi-
dence in the self-defense context.
B. The Illinois Rule Before People v. Lynch
Prior to 1984, specific act evidence that was offered to prove that
the victim had been the aggressor during the incident in question was
not admissible in Illinois. 84 Rather, Illinois courts, with few excep-
tions, routinely ruled that a defendant is limited to proof of a victim's
80. People v. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d 1018,1021 (Ill. 1984). Contra Heidel v. State, 587 So. 2d 835,
846 (Miss. 1991).
81. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d at 1021; see also Horton, supra note 53, at 457 ("[Iln criminal cases
there is to be greater latitude in admitting exculpatory evidence than in determining whether
prejudicial potentialities in proof offered to show guilt should result in its exclusion .... " (quot-
ing In re Robert S., 420 N.E.2d 390, 394 (N.Y. 1981) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting))). Contra Heidel
v. State, 587 So. 2d 835, 846 (Miss. 1991) (stating that "in the case of a man on trial for assault,
the prosecution may not prove that the man assaulted another two weeks earlier" because the
prejudicial effect of such evidence tends to outweigh the probative value and that the same view
of jury psychology supports precluding such evidence of the victim).
82. Larsen, supra note 75, at 660.
83. Horton, supra note 53, at 457 (quoting In re Robert S., 420 N.E.2d 390, 394 (N.Y. 1981)
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting)).
84. See supra note 2 (citing cases standing for the proposition that specific act evidence is
inadmissible to prove that the victim was the aggressor).
[Vol. 46:183
VICTIM OR VILLAIN?
reputation if the purpose of the evidence is to establish that the victim
had been the aggressor during the incident in question.8 5
People v. Popovich8 6 is a clear illustration of the application of this
rule. In Popovich, the defendant, who was charged with murder,
asserted self-defense.8 7 At trial, the defendant sought to introduce ev-
idence that the deceased at one time drew a pistol on him to force him
to sign an agreement.8 8 The trial court excluded this evidence and the
defendant was subsequently convicted.89 On appeal, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the exclusion of this evidence was not error
because it was not probative of the victim's character. 90 In so holding,
the court explained that a victim's violent character may be proved
only by reputation evidence and not by evidence of a prior bad act
committed by the victim.91
People v. Peeler92 also exemplifies the pre-Lynch rule of admissibil-
ity. In Peeler, the defendant, who was charged with murder, asserted
self-defense and testified that the victim had been the aggressor.93 To
prove that the victim was the aggressor, the defendant introduced evi-
dence from a third-party witness that the victim "was feared in the
neighborhood. '94 The defendant also attempted to elicit testimony
from the same third-party witness about prior bad acts that were com-
mitted by the victim against someone other than the defendant.95 The
trial court excluded this evidence.96
The defendant appealed and claimed that the exclusion of this evi-
dence was prejudicial error; however, the appellate court disagreed,
finding that the trial court "was entirely proper" in excluding the evi-
dence. 97 In ruling on the exclusion of this evidence, the appellate
court recognized the general rule that a defendant who asserts self-
defense and claims that the victim was the aggressor may offer evi-
85. See supra note 2 (citing cases standing for the proposition that specific act evidence is
inadmissible to prove that the victim was the aggressor).
86. 129 N.E. 161 (Ill. 1920).
87. Id. at 163.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The court explained that "[w]hile there was testimony of numerous witnesses that the
reputation of the deceased for being a violent and dangerous man was bad, yet such testimony
did not aid or render competent the testimony of [the witness] sought to be introduced here."
Id.
92. 299 N.E.2d 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
93. Id. at 384.
94. Id. at 386.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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dence of specific acts of violence directed against the defendant.98
The court explained that this evidence is admissible because it "tends
to show the circumstances confronting the defendant, the extent of his
apparent danger and the motive by which he was influenced." 99 How-
ever, the Peeler court found that this rule did not apply to the evi-
dence offered in the case at bar. 00 The court noted that the evidence
that the defendant sought to introduce was evidence of acts commit-
ted by the victim that were not directed against the defendant.' 01
Rather, the testimony which the defendant's counsel attempted to
elicit from the third-party concerned specific instances which formed
the basis of the witness' opinion of the victim's reputation.102 The
Peeler court found that "[i]t is fundamental that such evidence is
inadmissible."1 03
People v. Robinson'°4 represents another example of where a court
applied the general rule that a defendant may use only reputation evi-
dence to prove a victim's violent character and, thus, that the victim
was the aggressor.105 In Robinson, the defendant was charged with
aggravated battery for allegedly striking a police officer in the face. 10 6
At trial, the defendant asserted that he did not strike the officer, but
that the officer had filed the charge in an attempt to hide the truth. 0 7
The defendant alleged that the officer had stopped him for a traffic
violation, lost his temper and struck the defendant in the face. 0 8 To
support his defense, the defendant sought to admit, and the trial court
subsequently excluded, evidence of specific instances in which the of-
ficer had allegedly used excessive force. 10 9
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. After testifying that the victim "was pretty well feared by the neighborhood," the
third party was asked why this was so. The prosecution's objections to this line of questioning
were sustained. Id.
103. Id.
104. 371 N.E.2d 1170 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
105. Id. at 1176. In Robinson, the defendant did not claim self-defense; rather, he claimed
that the officer had attacked him and that charges were brought against him only in order to
conceal this fact. Id. at 1171-72, 1175. However, the court ruled that the rules on the admissibil-
ity of specific act evidence in the self-defense context apply because the defendant had intro-
duced evidence that the police officer had attacked him. Id. at 1175.
106. Id. at 1171.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1171-72.
109. Id. at 1172-73, 1176. The defendant also unsuccessfully tried to admit evidence that the
Federal Bureau of Investigations was investigating charges that the officer had frequently used
excessive force, especially against black individuals, in the course of his duties as a police officer
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The defendant appealed the exclusion of this testimony, contending
that the excluded evidence should have been admitted because the
evidence was offered to show that the police officer "was of a violent
disposition." 110 The court agreed that evidence of the officer's violent
disposition was relevant because it "tended to corroborate the defend-
ant's version" of the incident.111 The court stated that "[t]he question
remains, however, whether evidence of specific violent acts is admissi-
ble to prove that a witness has a violent character."' 112 In answering
this question, the court acknowledged:
It is well settled that where a defendant claims self-defense and pre-
liminary testimony establishes an act of aggression by the alleged
victim of defendant's acts, the defendant is permitted to introduce
evidence concerning the violent temper and disposition of the vic-
tim and any prior threats or misconduct by the victim directed to-
ward the defendant.113
The court then stated,
[T]he law in Illinois has long been settled that proof of a violent
temper and disposition can only be made through evidence of the
witness' reputation for that particular character trait (citations omit-
ted), and we feel that if this rule is to be abolished it must be done
by the supreme court. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did
not err in excluding the evidence of [the officer's] prior acts of
violence. 1 4
However, as People v. Robinson illustrates, while the general rule
was that specific act evidence was inadmissible, a growing number of
appellate court decisions seemed to indicate a willingness to admit this
evidence when offered by a defendant to prove that the victim was the
aggressor."15
and evidence that on November 23, 1976, the officer had been suspended from the Alton police
force for conduct unbecoming of a police officer. Id. at 1172-74.
110. Id. at 1175.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1176.
115. See, e.g., People v. Gossett, 451 N.E.2d 280, 284-86 (111. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that the
trial court erred in excluding evidence of specific acts of violence committed by the homicide
victim "which were not directed at the defendant and of which the defendant had no knowledge
at the time of the incident"); People v. Fischer, 426 N.E.2d 965, 969 (I11. App. Ct. 1981) (sug-
gesting that some types of specific act evidence might be admissible due to its probative value);
People v. Buchanan, 414 N.E.2d 262, 264 (1ll. App. Ct. 1980) (stating that evidence that the
victim had committed violent acts helps corroborate the defendant's testimony that the victim
had been the aggressor); People v. Montgomery, 366 N.E.2d 623, 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (ap-
proving of the Baer court's conclusion that "specific prior incidents of violent aggression by the
victim may be admissible as tending to show that he was the aggressor in the incident"); People
v. Baer, 342 N.E.2d 177, 181 (11. App. Ct. 1976) (concluding that "specific prior incidents of
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People v. Fischer,116 decided three years prior to Lynch, exemplifies
this trend in the appellate courts. In Fischer, the defendant, charged
with two counts of murder and two counts of armed violence, pled
self-defense and claimed that the victim was the aggressor.117 To sup-
port his version of the incident, the defendant attempted to elicit testi-
mony from a third party about prior bad acts committed by the
victim.118 The third-party witness, who was the bartender at a bar fre-
quented by the victim, would have testified that on one occasion the
bartender told the victim he could not exit through the back door of
the tavern and the victim did so anyway.119 The witness also would
have testified that on another occasion, the witness refused to serve
the victim a drink, after which the victim "began pounding the bar and
name calling.' 20
The Fischer court, found that the trial judge had properly excluded
the evidence because these particular specific acts had no probative
value in making the determination of whether the victim had been the
aggressor during the incident in question.' 2 ' The court stated,
Many individuals become loud and somewhat less orderly after a
few hours of drinking in their local tavern. This does not make
them violent persons. We do not believe that this evidence has any
probative value in determining whether in the fight with [the victim]
defendant was the aggressor or acting in self defense. Accordingly,
we find that the trial judge properly excluded this evidence.' 22
However, while holding that this particular evidence was insufficient,
the court left open the question of whether some specific act evidence
might be sufficient for this purpose. 2 3
Thus, prior to the 1984 case of People v. Lynch, the general rule of
law in Illinois was that a defendant who sought to establish that the
victim was the aggressor by proof of the victim's violent character was
limited to establishing such character by reputation evidence. Evi-
dence of specific instances of conduct was inadmissible. However, a
violent aggression by the victim may be admissible as tending to show that he was the aggressor
in the incident").
116. 426 N.E.2d 965 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
117. Id. at 966-67.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 968-69.
120. Id. at 969.
121. Id.
122. Id.; cf. People v. Cobb, 542 N.E.2d 1171, 1178 (I11. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 548 N.E.2d
1072 (Ill. 1989) (holding that evidence that the victim became "rowdy and argumentative" when
she drank alcohol did not establish that the victim was a violent person).
123. Fischer, 426 N.E.2d at 968. The court stated that "[w]here evidence of specific acts is
sought for such purpose [to prove circumstantially that the victim was the aggressor], it would
serve no purpose to require defendant to have knowledge of the prior acts." Id.
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growing number of appellate court decisions seemingly paved the way
for Lynch.' 24
C. People v. Lynch
In People v. Lynch,125 the Illinois Supreme Court created an excep-
tion to the well-established rule that specific act evidence is inadmissi-
ble to establish that the victim had been the aggressor during the
incident in question. The Lynch court held that a victim's prior bat-
tery convictions, of which the defendant was unaware at the time of
the incident in question, were admissible to prove that the victim had
been the aggressor. 126
1. The Majority Opinion
In Lynch, the defendant was tried for murder for shooting the dece-
dent in the head. 127 The defendant asserted self-defense. 28 At the
defendant's trial, the evidence conflicted as to whether the defendant
or the victim was the initial aggressor. 129 To prove the victim's pro-
pensity toward violence and, thus, that the victim was the aggressor,
the defendant sought to admit evidence of the victim's three prior
convictions for battery.130 The trial court excluded this evidence
"[b]ecause the defendant was unaware of [the convictions] when he
shot [the victim]"; therefore, the prior convictions were "irrelevant
and inadmissible.' 3' The jury returned a verdict of voluntary man-
slaughter and the appellate court affirmed the conviction. 132
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that "when the theory
of self-defense is raised, the victim's aggressive and violent character
is relevant to show who was the aggressor, and the defendant may
show it by appropriate evidence, regardless of when he learned of
it.' 133 The court found that the three prior battery convictions were
124. People v. Gossett, 451 N.E.2d 280 (I11. App. Ct. 1983); People v. Fischer, 426 N.E.2d 965
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981); People v. Buchanan, 414 N.E.2d 262 (I11. App. Ct. 1980); People v. Mont-
gomery, 366 N.E.2d 623 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); People v. Baer, 342 N.E.2d 177 (I1l. App. Ct. 1976).
125. 470 N.E.2d 1018 (111. 1984).
126. Id. at 1020-21.
127. Id. at 1019.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1019-20.
132. Id. at 1019. The appellate court rejected the defendant's contention that the exclusion of
evidence of the victim's prior convictions was error on the ground that the defendant had failed
to make an offer of proof. Id. However, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that this conclusion
was erroneous. Id. at 1021.
133. Id. at 1020.
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"reasonably reliable evidence of a violent character;" thus, the trial
court should have allowed the defendant to introduce this evidence in
an attempt to prove that the victim had been the aggressor.134
The court explained that the violent character of the victim is rele-
vant to prove two distinct evidentiary purposes when self-defense is at
issue.135 The first purpose is to prove that the defendant's use of
deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances. 136 The court
stated that "the defendant's knowledge of the victim's violent tenden-
cies necessarily affects his perceptions of and reactions to the victim's
behavior" and, thus, may be used to prove that the use of deadly force
was reasonable. 137
The second evidentiary purpose to which the victim's character is
relevant is to circumstantially establish who was the aggressor. 38 The
court explained that "evidence of the victim's propensity for violence
tends to support the defendant's version of the facts where there are
conflicting accounts of what happened.' 39 In this factual scenario,
the court determined that the jury should have been allowed to con-
sider all of the available facts in order to determine what actually oc-
curred.140 Thus, evidence of the three prior battery convictions was
relevant to determine whether the defendant or the victim had been
the aggressor.14'
The court acknowledged that such evidence is normally inadmissi-
ble against a defendant to prove the offense charged "because the
danger of prejudice outweighs the relevance of the evidence where
the defendant stands to lose his liberty ... if convicted."' 42 However,
the court found that "[w]here the victim's propensity for violence is in
question .... the danger of prejudice to the defendant lies in refusing
to admit such evidence, while its high degree of relevance and reliabil-
ity remains constant.' '143
The Lynch majority limited its holding in two ways. First, the court
stated that "a defendant may not introduce evidence of the victim's
character until some evidence has been presented that the victim was
[the aggressor] and that the defendant therefore acted in self de-
134. Id. at 1020-21.
135. Id. at 1020.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1020-21.
142. Id. at 1021.
143. Id.
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fense." 14 The court thus stated that such evidence is not admissible
unless self-defense is at issue.145
The Lynch court also limited its holding by refusing to hold that any
battery conviction necessarily proves a propensity towards violence.' 46
Rather, the court found that these particular battery convictions were
competent evidence because the convictions were recent 147 Illinois
convictions. 48
2. Lynch's Dissent
In Lynch, Chief Justice Ryan filed a dissenting opinion which was
joined by Justice Ward.' 49 Like the majority, the dissenters recog-
nized the two distinct evidentiary purposes for which evidence of a
victim's character may be admitted: (1) to prove the defendant's state
of mind and (2) to prove that the victim was the initial aggressor. 150
However, the dissenters argued that, while evidence of a victim's
threats or conduct may be admissible to prove the former, this same
evidence may not be sufficient to prove the latter, i.e., that the victim
was the aggressor at the time of the incident at issue.' 51 The dissent-
ers reasoned that "the mere fact that [someone] has been convicted of
a battery is not necessarily evidence of a violent... character.' 52 The
conviction may have arisen "out of a domestic [quarrel] or out of
charges and countercharges growing out of a quarrel."'1 53 In addition,
a wide range of conduct may constitute a battery under Illinois law.' 54
Based on the above reasoning, the dissenters found that the evi-
dence was insufficient to sustain a reversal for two reasons. 55 First,
the defendant had not informed the court as to which of the two evi-
dentiary propositions he was attempting to prove by the evidence.' 56
144. Id. at 1022.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1021. This court did state that "[iln general, battery is prima facie probative
enough of aggressive and violent tendencies to be admissible." Id.
147. One of the battery convictions came only weeks before the homicide. Id.
148. Id. The court noted that because the convictions were all in Illinois, the Illinois definition
of battery had been the standard and there was "no problem of a strange definition of battery in
another jurisdiction." Id.
149. Id. at 1022, 1024.
150. Id. at 1023 (Ryan, J., dissenting); see supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text (discussing
the two distinct evidentiary purposes that the defendant may use character evidence to prove).
151. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d at 1023.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. Chief Justice Ryan noted that a push or a slap may constitute battery under the
Illinois statute. Id.
155. Id. at 1024.
156. Id.
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Second, the defendant had not informed the court of "the nature of
the conduct which was the basis for the prior convictions."'157
3. Impact of the Lynch Opinion
The Lynch holding was the first time that the Illinois Supreme Court
had articulated this exception to the well-established rule that prior
bad acts committed by the victim are not admissible to prove that the
victim had been the aggressor. Read narrowly, the Illinois appellate
courts could have determined that the Lynch court intended for this
exception to apply only in limited cases. First, Lynch could be read as
only allowing in evidence of a victim's prior bad acts of which the
defendant was unaware at the time of the incident in question if the
evidence is offered to prove that the victim was the aggressor.158
Under this reading, such evidence would not be admissible to prove
that the defendant feared the victim.' 59 In addition, Lynch could be
read as only allowing in such evidence in homicide cases.1 60 Thus,
Lynch would not be applicable in a case where the defendant is
charged with anything less than homicide.' 6' Finally, Lynch could be
read as only allowing in such evidence if the prior bad acts are certi-
fied convictions and the court finds that the acts are admissible after
conducting the requisite evidentiary balancing test of admissibility. 62
Not all Illinois appellate courts, however, have adopted this narrow
interpretation of Lynch.163
157. Id.
158. But see infra notes 172-85.
159. But see infra notes 227-29 (discussing why this should be the rule).
160. But see infra notes 186-98.
161. Id.
162. But see infra notes 199-209. Under the evidentiary balancing test, the court must first
determine if the proffered evidence is relevant. GRAHAM, supra note 1, §§ 401.1, 403.1. "Evi-
dence is relevant when it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." People v. Lovings, 655 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (I11. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 660 N.E.2d
1275 (I11. 1995); accord People v. Eyler, 549 N.E.2d 268, 288 (III. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881
(1990); People v. Monroe, 362 N.E.2d 295, 297 (III. 1977).
If the court finds that the proffered evidence is relevant, the court must then determine
whether to admit the evidence. GRAHAM, supra note 1, § 403.1. Generally, relevant evidence is
admissible unless the court finds that the probative value of such evidence is substantially out-
weighed by one or more of the following disadvantages: "unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, misleading the jury, considerations of undue delay, waste of time, and the needless pres-
entation of cumulative evidence." Id.; accord People v. Booker, 653 N.E.2d 952, 954 (11. App.
Ct. 1995) ("Proffered evidence which has little probative value due to remoteness, uncertainty,
or its potential prejudicial nature may be rejected as irrelevant.").
163. See infra part II.D (discussing decisions of the Illinois appellate courts which have inter-
preted the Lynch opinion).
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D. The Illinois Appellate Courts' Interpretation of Lynch
Some Illinois appellate courts have read Lynch broadly and have
not confined it to a narrow exception. 164 In so doing, the appellate
courts have extended Lynch's holding in three significant ways.165
First, citing Lynch, some appellate courts have allowed the defendant
to offer evidence of a victim's prior bad acts, which were unknown to
the defendant at the time in question, to prove that the defendant was
reasonably afraid of the victim.1 66 Thus, the appellate courts have not
limited Lynch's holding only to cases where there is a dispute as to
who was the aggressor. 67 Secondly, some lower courts have applied
the Lynch rule to cases where the defendant is charged with a crime
other than murder; thus, Lynch's holding now extends beyond homi-
cide cases. 68 Finally, some appellate courts have cited Lynch as the
authority for admitting a wide range of prior bad acts, ranging from
164. See infra notes 165-209 and accompanying text (discussing the ways that the appellate
courts have extended Lynch).
165. However, the Lynch rule has not been extended to apply in cases where self-defense is
not at issue. People v. Armstrong, 653 N.E.2d 17, 18-19 (Il1. App. Ct. 1995); People v. Batac, 631
N.E.2d 373, 384 (I11. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 537 N.E.2d 815 (I11. 1994); People v. Chapman, 633
N.E.2d 718, 732 (I11. App. Ct. 1992); People v. Isbell, 532 N.E.2d 964, 971 (I11. App. Ct. 1988),
cert. denied, 537 N.E.2d 815 (I11. 1989); People v. Charleston, 477 N.E.2d 762, 765 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985). In addition, the courts have not extended the Lynch rule to allow in evidence of a by-
stander's propensity for violence. People v. Bridges, 544 N.E.2d 40, 42 (I11. App. Ct.), cert. de-
nied, 548 N.E.2d 1072 (I11. 1989) (refusing to extend Lynch to cover a bystander, i.e., one who
was merely present during the incident in question, as opposed to a victim, because doing so
"would have the effect of making a man with a violent past fair game for killing").
166. See, e.g., People v. Davidson, 601 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (allowing the
defendant to prove that he was afraid of the victim by evidence of the victim's prior theft convic-
tions, hospitalizations, and drug and alcohol dependencies); see also infra notes 170-82 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Davidson case in depth). Contra People v. Ciavirelli, 635
N.E.2d 610, 614-15 (I11. App. Ct. 1994) (representing the opposite interpretation of Lynch in
stating that prior acts of violence which postdated the shooting in question could not have af-
fected the defendant's state of mind at the time of the shooting).
167. See, e.g., Davidson, 601 N.E.2d at 1150 (holding that the trial court erred in excluding
evidence that the defendant offered in order to prove that he was reasonably afraid of the victim
where the evidence was that the victim had acted violently at a mental institution five months
after the incident).
168. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 587 N.E.2d 47, 49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that "[i]t is well-
settled that when a theory of self-defense is raised in a battery case, evidence of the peaceful or
violent character of either the accused or the victim may be relevant as circumstantial evidence
to show which party was the initial aggressor"); People v. Keefe, 567 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (I11. App.
Ct. 1991) (applying the Lynch rule in the battery context); People v. Randle, 498 N.E.2d 732, 735
(I11. App. Ct. 1986) (reading the Lynch rule as applying to both homicide and battery cases); see
also infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Keefe case in detail). But cf. Peo-
ple v. Lovings, 655 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (I11. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 660 N.E.2d 1275 (I11. 1995)
(refusing "to extend the Lynch rule and hold that, in an armed robbery or robbery case, a de-
fendant may question the complaining witness regarding past instances of violent behavior by
the witness for the purpose of showing that the witness did not subjectively feel threatened by
the defendant's actions").
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evidence of prior convictions to evidence of bad acts that had not re-
sulted in a conviction. 169 For example, one court allowed the defend-
ant to prove that the victim had been the aggressor by offering
evidence that the victim, while waiting in a drive-through restaurant
line, had once bumped another individual's automobile three times. 170
Thus, Lynch's holding is not necessarily limited to evidence of a vic-
tim's prior convictions; rather, the defendant might be allowed to offer
evidence of any bad act, regardless of whether it resulted in a
conviction. 171
People v. Davidson172 exemplifies the first broad interpretation of
Lynch, which is that Lynch allows a defendant to offer evidence of a
victim's prior bad acts, of which the defendant was unaware, to prove
169. See, e.g., People v. Clarke, 612 N.E.2d 1351, 1354 (II. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 622 N.E.2d
1213 (IM. 1993) (allowing the defendant to offer evidence that the victim, while waiting in a
drive-through restaurant line, had once bumped another individual's car three times from be-
hind); People v. Devine, 557 N.E.2d 953, 956 (II1. App. Ct. 1990), cert. denied, 575 N.E.2d 918
(II1. 1991) (noting that the trial court had allowed the defendant to attempt to prove that the
victim was the aggressor by introducing evidence of the victim's prior misdemeanor conviction,
and testimony that the victim had carried a gun on occasion, that the victim became violent when
on cocaine, and that the victim had once shot at an old boyfriend); People v. Crum, 539 N.E.2d
196, 203 (II. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 545 N.E.2d 118 (I1. 1989) (holding that the trial court im-
properly excluded evidence that the victim had pulled a gun on one or more individuals which
the defendant offered to prove that he had acted in self-defense); People v. Hanson, 485 N.E.2d
1144, 1149-50 (III. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error when
it prevented the defendant from presenting two witnesses who would have testified that the
victim had threatened a person with a knife at a tavern and another witness who would have
testified that the victim threatened "him and his wife with a knife when [the victim] felt the
witness had run his car off the road" because this evidence was "relevant to show who was the
aggressor"). Contra People v. Costillo, 608 N.E.2d 100, 107 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that the
victim's arrest record for unlawful possession of a weapon without evidence that the victim bran-
dished the weapon or used it in any way did not indicate that the victim was a violent person);
People v. Gilbert, 586 N.E.2d 1308, 1313 (I1. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 596 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. 1992)
(reading Lynch as allowing in evidence of the victim's prior aggravated battery conviction but
not the victim's prior convictions for criminal damage to property and unlawful delivery of can-
nabis); People v. Ellis, 543 N.E.2d 196,200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), cert. denied, 553 N.E.2d 398 (III.),
and cert. denied, 498 U.S. 942 (1990) (holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence of
the victim's prior arrests because "evidence of a victim's mere arrest is inadmissible since it does
not indicate whether the victim actually performed any of the acts charged"); but cf. People v.
Loggins, 629 N.E.2d 137, 143-44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding that the trial court properly pre-
cluded the defendant from asking whether the victim had been "seen to get aggressive" because
the question did not properly identify any specific prior act of violence).
170. Clarke, 612 N.E.2d at 154; see infra notes 199-209 and accompanying text (discussing the
Clarke case in detail).
171. See, e.g., infra notes 199-209 and accompanying text (discussing the Clarke case where
the defendant was allowed to prove the victim's violent character by offering in a third-party's
testimony that the victim had once bumped his car three times from behind while waiting in a
drive-through restaurant's line).
172. 601 N.E.2d 1146 (III. App. Ct. 1992).
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that the defendant was afraid of the victim. 173 In Davidson, the de-
fendant was charged with attempted first-degree murder, aggravated
battery and armed violence for stabbing the victim three times in the
chest during an altercation.174 At trial, the defendant argued that he
was afraid of the victim because the victim had attacked him the week
before; thus, he had grabbed a knife in an effort to protect himself.175
In contrast, the victim testified that he did not recognize the defend-
ant at the time of the incident. 76 He further testified that the defend-
ant had attacked him and had stabbed him three times in the chest
because he had refused to give the defendant some of the beer that he
was drinking.177
At trial, the defendant presented evidence of the victim's violent
character to prove that the degree of force that he had used was justi-
fied because of the victim's propensity for violence.'78 First, the de-
fendant testified that the victim had attacked him during the prior
week. 179 In addition, the court allowed the defendant to introduce
evidence of the victim's prior theft convictions, hospitalizations, and
drug and alcohol dependencies. 80 However, the trial court refused to
admit evidence that five months after the fight between the defendant
and the victim, the victim had threatened the staff at a mental hospital
with bodily harm and needed to be placed in restraints.' 8'
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in excluding the
evidence of the incident at the mental hospital since the incident was
"undeniably connected to the self-defense argument."' 82 Citing
173. See id. at 1150 (allowing the defendant to prove that he was afraid of the victim by evi-
dence of the victim's prior theft convictions, hospitalizations, and drug and alcohol dependen-
cies). Contra People v. Ciavirelli, 635 N.E.2d 610, 614-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (finding that prior
acts of violence which postdated the shooting in question could not have affected the defendant's
state of mind at the time of the shooting); People v. Williams, 617 N.E.2d 87, 96 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (explaining that "one can only consider facts one knows, and evidence of the victim's
character is irrelevant to the self-defense theory unless the defendant knew of the victim's vio-
lent nature").
174. Davidson, 601 N.E.2d at 1147-48.
175. Id. at 1148.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1149-50.
179. Id. at 1150. On cross-examination, the victim admitted to having a prior aggravated bat-
tery conviction, but he denied that he had an aggravated assault conviction and did not recall
that he had fought with the defendant the prior week. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. But see People v. Ware, 536 N.E.2d 713, 717-18 (II1. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that
evidence of a psychiatric report taken of the victim twelve days after the incident in question was
not relevant to prove that the victim had been the aggressor).
19961
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Lynch, 183 the appellate court reasoned that case law supports the
proposition that where a defendant asserts self-defense, the defendant
has the right to present evidence of prior violent and/or aggressive
acts by the injured party, regardless of whether the evidence is offered
to prove the defendant's state of mind or that the victim was the ag-
gressor. 184 In addition, the Davidson court viewed Lynch as authoriz-
ing the admission of all types of specific act evidence, regardless of
whether the incident resulted in a conviction. 185
People v. Keefe186 illustrates the Illinois appellate courts' second ex-
tension of Lynch, which is the extension to cases involving a defendant
who is charged with a crime other than homicide. 87 In Keefe, the
defendant was charged with attempted first-degree murder, aggra-
vated battery, and armed violence.'8 8 These charges arose from an
altercation that the defendant had had with the victim in which the
defendant had stabbed the victim twice in the back.' 89 At trial, the
defendant asserted self-defense. 90 The evidence conflicted as to
whether the defendant or the victim was the aggressor at the time of
183. Davidson, 601 N.E.2d at 1149-50. The court explained that the Lynch court had found
the victim's prior convictions for violence admissible because the convictions were evidence of
the reasonableness of the degree of force used against the victim. Id. at 1150. However, the
Lynch court had actually found that particular type of specific act evidence was admissible to
demonstrate that the victim had a violent character in order to prove that the victim was the
aggressor. People v. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d 1018, 1020 (III. 1984).
184. See supra notes 126-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Lynch holding); see also
supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text (discussing the two distinct evidentiary propositions
for which character evidence is admissible).
185. See Davidson, 601 N.E.2d at 1150 (allowing the defendant to prove that he was afraid of
the victim by evidence of the victim's prior hospitalizations and drug and alcohol dependencies).
But cf. People v. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (11l. 1984) (holding that the prior battery convic-
tions were admissible due to the probative value and high degree of relevance where the victim's
propensity for violence was in question).
186. 567 N.E.2d 1052 (111. App. Ct. 1991).
187. See id. at 1059 (viewing the Lynch holding as applying to cases where the defendant is
charged with battery and not just where the defendant is charged with homicide); see also People
v. Harris, 587 N.E.2d 47, 49 (111. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that "[i]t is well-settled that when a
theory of self-defense is raised in a battery case, evidence of the peaceful or violent character of
either the accused or the victim may be relevant as circumstantial evidence to show which party
was the initial aggressor"); People v. Randle, 498 N.E.2d 732, 735 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (reading
the Lynch rule as applying to both homicide and battery cases). But cf. People v. Lovings, 655
N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (I1. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 660 N.E.2d 1275 (Ill. 1995) (refusing "to extend
the Lynch rule and hold that, in an armed robbery or robbery case, a defendant may question
the complaining witness regarding past instances of violent behavior by the witness for the pur-
pose of showing that the witness did not subjectively feel threatened by the defendant's
actions").
188. Keefe, 567 N.E.2d at 1053.
189. Id. at 1054.
190. Id. at 1056.
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the stabbing. 191 The trial court prohibited the defendant from eliciting
testimony relating to the victim's character for violence.' 92 A jury
found the defendant guilty of all charges and the defendant
appealed.1 93
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in excluding evi-
dence of the victim's violent propensities. 94 The court reasoned that
the Lynch holding is not limited to murder or attempted murder cases;
rather, evidence of a victim's violent character may be admitted in
battery cases where self-defense is at issue.195
In addition, the court held such evidence is admissible not only to
show "who threw the first punch," but also to show who the aggressor
was at the time the injury was inflicted. 96 Thus, the court reasoned
that while the victim was indisputably the first aggressor, there was a
question as to who the aggressor was at the time of the stabbing. 97
Accordingly, the court held that the trial court should have admitted
the evidence because it tended to support the defendant's version of
the facts.' 98
Finally, People v. Clarke'99 exemplifies the appellate courts' third
extension of Lynch, which is that Lynch allows the court to admit a
wide range of specific act evidence, not only prior convictions, to
prove a victim's violent character. 200 In Clarke, the victim and the
191. Id. at 1059. Pursuant to the testimony at trial, it was undisputed that the victim was the
initial aggressor; however, it was unclear who the aggressor was at the time of the stabbing. Id.
192. Id. at 1058. The evidence which the defendant attempted to elicit concerned a statement
that the victim had made to a doctor, indicating that the victim had been to the "hospital on
several occasions because of injuries incurred while fighting." Id. at 1054. The trial court pro-
hibited the defendant from eliciting such testimony on the grounds that evidence of the victim's
violent character was admissible only in homicide cases and, thus, was irrelevant here because it
was undisputed that the victim was the initial aggressor. Id. at 1058-59.
193. Id. at 1053.
194. Id. at 1059.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. 612 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 622 N.E.2d 1213 (II. 1993).
200. In Clarke, the evidence was testimony from a third party that the victim had once
bumped another individual's automobile three times while waiting in a drive-through restaurant
line. Id. at 1354; see also People v. Davidson, 601 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (11. App. Ct. 1992) (holding
that evidence related to an incident in a mental hospital that occurred five months after the
incident in question and had not resulted in a prior conviction was admissible); People v. Devine,
557 N.E.2d 953, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), cert. denied, 575 N.E.2d 918 (I11. 1991) (noting that the
trial court had allowed the defendant to attempt to prove that the victim was the aggressor by
introducing evidence of the victim's prior misdemeanor conviction, and testimony that the victim
had carried a gun on occasion, that the victim became violent when on cocaine, and that the
victim had once shot at an old boyfriend); People v. Crum, 539 N.E.2d 196, 203 (I11. App. Ct.),
cert. denied, 545 N.E.2d 118 (I11. 1989) (holding that the trial court improperly excluded evidence
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defendant had engaged in a fight in which the defendant had stabbed
the victim in the ribs.20' The defendant was indicted and tried for
attempted murder and aggravated battery.202 At trial, the defendant
claimed that he had stabbed the victim in self-defense and that the
victim had been the aggressor.20 3 However, the victim testified that
the defendant had initiated the incident.2°4
To prove that the victim was the aggressor, the defendant was per-
mitted to produce evidence of the victim's aggressive and violent char-
acter.20 5 This evidence consisted of two witnesses testifying to
altercations that they had had with the victim.206 The first witness tes-
tified to an incident where the victim had bumped the witness' auto-
mobile "three times from behind while in a drive-through restaurant
line. '20 7 The second witness, a police officer, testified to the victim's
violent conduct during the police officer's arrest.20 8 The appellate
court, citing Lynch, explained that this type of evidence of the victim's
"aggressive and violent character was relevant and admissible to indi-
cate who was the aggressor" because the defendant had raised the
that the victim had pulled a gun on one or more individuals which the defendant offered to
prove that he had acted in self-defense); People v. Hanson, 485 N.E.2d 1144, 1149-50 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1985) (holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it prevented the defend-
ant from presenting two witnesses who would have testified that the victim had threatened a
person with a knife at a tavern and another witness who would have testified that the victim
threatened "him and his wife with a knife when [the victim] felt the witness had run his car off
the road" because this evidence was "relevant to show who was the aggressor"). Contra People
v. Costillo, 608 N.E.2d 100, 107 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that the victim's arrest record for
unlawful possession of a weapon without evidence that the victim brandished the weapon or
used it in any way does not indicate that the victim was a violent person); People v. Gilbert, 586
N.E.2d 1308, 1313 (IlI. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 596 N.E.2d 633 (III. 1992) (reading Lynch as only
allowing in evidence of the victim's prior aggravated battery conviction but not the victim's prior
convictions for criminal damage to property and unlawful delivery of cannabis); People v. Ellis,
543 N.E.2d 196, 200 (Il1. App. Ct. 1989), cert. denied, 553 N.E.2d 398 (111.), and cert. denied, 498
U.S. 942 (1990) (holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence of the victim's prior
arrests because "evidence of a victim's mere arrest is inadmissible since it does not indicate
whether the victim actually performed any of the acts charged"); but cf People v. Loggins, 629
N.E.2d 137, 143-44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding that the trial court properly precluded the de-
fendant from asking whether the victim had been "seen to get aggressive" because the question
did not properly identify any specific prior act of violence).
201. Clarke, 612 N.E.2d at 1352.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1353-54. Citing People v. Lynch, the court explained that "[s]ince defendant raised
the theory of self-defense and defendant and McBain [the victim] gave extremely different ver-
sions of the stabbing, evidence of McBain's aggressive and violent character was relevant and
admissible to indicate who was the aggressor." Id.
206. Id. at 1354.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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theory of self-defense and the defendant and the victim had given dif-
ferent versions of the stabbing.20 9
E. The Cook County State's Attorney's Office's Response to Lynch
In response to the deleterious effect the Lynch rule has had on
prosecutorial efforts, the Cook County State's Attorney's Office pro-
posed a statutory remedy. 210 The Office is currently lobbying for a
new statute which would allow specific act evidence to be used only to
prove the defendant's state of mind if the defendant was aware of the
incidents. 211 This proposed statute reads as follows:
725 ILCS 5/115-16. Prior violent acts by the victim as evidence.
a. In prosecutions for crimes involving the use of force by a defend-
ant where a defendant asserts that he was legally justified in the use
of force, evidence of the victim's prior violent acts is not admissible
unless such prior violent acts were actually known to the defendant
at the time he committed the crime being prosecuted.
b. This section shall not be construed to alter existing law regarding
the use of prior convictions as impeachment. 212
The author of the proposed statute argues that the statute's provi-
sions are necessary to alleviate the problems that Lynch has cre-
ated.213 The most significant problems are that Lynch allows the
defendant to introduce unreliable evidence that is not relevant to his
state of mind regarding his self-defense claim; that Lynch allows the
defendant to introduce propensity evidence that can never be intro-
duced against the defendant; and that Lynch allows propensity evi-
dence to be introduced against the victim who is unable to defend
himself.214 Such problems, according to the author, have "pervert[ed]
the trial process" and have created a "prosecutor's nightmare. '215
The proposed statute would eliminate these problems and return Illi-
nois law to the pre-Lynch rule that evidence of a victim's prior violent
acts must be actually known to the defendant to be admissible. 216
209. Id. at 1353-54.
210. Memorandum from Peter Fischer, Deputy Supervisor of the Cook County State's Attor-
ney's Office, to Randall E. Roberts, Executive Assistant of the Cook County State's Attorney's
Office (July 10, 1995) (on file with the author).
211. Id. at 1.
212. Id. at 15. The memo further explains "[p]aragraph (b) is necessary to signal the fact that
the legislature is not engaging the traditional rules for impeachment by a prior conviction." Id.
213. Id. at 1.
214. Id. at 14. The author also notes the additional problem that "in cases involving police
officers as victims there will be a ready made Lynch file in the form of OPS [Office of Profes-
sional Standards] records yet the positive information in those files cannot go to the jury." Id.
215. Id. at 13-14.
216. See supra notes 84-124 and accompanying text (discussing the Illinois rule of admissibility
of such evidence prior to Lynch).
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F The Rule on the Admissibility of Such Evidence in Other
Jurisdictions
American courts are almost evenly split on this issue, with Illinois
representing the minority view. TWenty-one jurisdictions have
adopted the Lynch position.217 "Nearly all of [these jurisdictions]
have applied the rule with some sort of limitation . ,,218 For exam-
ple, Connecticut and Utah have adopted the position that specific act
evidence that is offered to prove that the victim was the aggressor is
admissible only in the form of a prior conviction.219 In contrast, Iowa
only allows in evidence of a victim's prior bad acts in criminal cases,220
while the District of Columbia only admits such evidence in homicide
cases.
221
In contrast, thirty jurisdictions have adopted the pre-Lynch rule that
"prior specific instances of a victim's conduct are admissible to show a
defendant's state of mind, but not to show that the victim was the
probable aggressor. '222 One state, Montana, has not adopted a defini-
tive rule.223
II. ANALYSIS
A. Illinois Appellate Courts' Improper Reading of Lynch
The broad rule of admissibility established by the post-Lynch appel-
late courts is an unsupported and improper reading of Lynch. First,
217. Horton, supra note 53, at 454-55 (citing cases in Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, District
of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Virginia and the code of Wyoming
which have adopted a rule similar to the Lynch rule).
218. Horton, supra note 53, at 454-55.
219. Horton, supra note 53, at 455 (citing State v. Miranda, 405 A.2d 622, 625 (Conn. 1978)
(holding that only prior convictions for crimes of violence are admissible to prove a victim's
violent propensity); State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 96 (Utah 1992) (holding that criminal convic-
tions are the only form of specific act evidence admissible to prove the victim's violent
character)).
220. See, e.g., Klaes v. Scholl, 375 N.W.2d 671, 674-75 (Iowa 1985) (refusing to allow evidence
of a victim's prior bad act in a civil assault case).
221. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 618 A.2d 140, 144 (D.C. 1992) (allowing evidence of
specific instances of a victim's prior violent conduct only in homicide cases).
222. Horton, supra note 53, at 455 (citing cases from Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Car-
olina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, the Virgin Islands, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin).
223. Horton, supra note 53, at 455 (citing MoNT. R. EvID. 405 comment ("Existing Montana
law has dealt with this method of proof only in criminal cases involving the violent character of
the victim offered by the accused to show that the amount of force used by the accused to defend
himself was reasonable.")).
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the courts should not allow a defendant to prove the reasonableness
of his state of mind by offering evidence of a victim's prior bad acts if
the defendant was unaware of them at the time of the incident in
question.224 Secondly, the courts should not apply Lynch to cases
where the defendant is charged with anything less than homicide. 225
Finally, Lynch does not stand for the authority to admit prior bad acts
that did not result in a conviction.226
First, the courts should not allow a defendant to prove the reasona-
bleness of his state of mind by offering evidence of a victim's prior bad
acts if the defendant was unaware of them at the time of the incident
in question. When the defendant seeks to prove that he was afraid of
the victim, specific acts of evidence of which the defendant was una-
ware are irrelevant since the defendant's state of mind could not have
been affected by such prior acts.
The Lynch court clearly articulated a difference in admitting specific
act evidence offered to prove the defendant's state of mind and spe-
cific act evidence offered to prove the victim's propensity for vio-
lence. 227 The Lynch court explicitly stated, as courts prior to Lynch
had,228 that when the defendant offers specific act evidence to prove
his state of mind, he must have been aware of the violent acts before
the incident in question.229 Thus, Lynch does not and should not
stand for the proposition that the defendant may prove that he was
afraid of the victim by evidence of the victim's prior bad acts of which
the defendant was unaware at the time of the incident in question.
Secondly, Illinois courts should not apply Lynch to cases where the
defendant is charged with anything less than homicide. The policy ar-
guments that support admissibility of such evidence, such as the con-
stitutional imperative to preserve a defendant's right to an adequate
224. See supra notes 172-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Illinois appellate court's
view in Davidson that Lynch allows a defendant to prove the reasonableness of his state of mind
with evidence of a victim's prior bad acts even where the defendant was unaware of the acts at
the time in question); see also infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text (discussing why this is
an unsupported and improper reading of Lynch).
225. See supra notes 186-99 and accompanying text (discussing the extension of the Lynch
holding to cases other than ones involving homicide); see also infra notes 231-35 and accompany-
ing text (discussing why this extension of Lynch is unwise).
226. See supra notes 199-209 and accompanying text (discussing the extension of Lynch to
include all types of prior bad acts, not just convictions).
227. See supra notes 125-48 and accompanying text (discussing Lynch's holding and
reasoning).
228. See supra notes 84-124 and accompanying text (discussing the pre-Lynch cases).
229. See supra notes 125-48 and accompanying text (discussing the holding and reasoning of
Lynch).
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defense,230 are stronger in a homicide than in a non-homicide case.
Because the victim is dead in a homicide case, there is less available
information and testimony from which the jury can discern the truth.
In a non-homicide case, the prosecution can call the victim as a wit-
ness who can then tell his side of the story; thus, the need for addi-
tional evidence in such cases is mitigated.
Additionally, the potential sentence for the defendant subject to a
murder charge weighs in favor of admitting such evidence in a homi-
cide case. The stakes are the highest for the defendant in a homicide
case because the court could potentially impose a sentence of life-im-
prisonment or death. As a result, the court should allow the defend-
ant greater latitude in defending himself. Admitting evidence of a
victim's prior bad acts is an example of the greater latitude that the
court should give the defendant charged with murder.
The contrary view is that the arguments that favor including such
evidence are stronger in non-homicide cases; thus, evidence should be
admitted in both contexts. In non-homicide cases, the victim is avail-
able to testify and can explain or defend his actions. 231 In addition,
the victim is able to cooperate with the prosecution so that the prose-
cution's burden in preparing to rebut every prior bad act is not insur-
mountable. 232 Thus, the argument for admissibility in non-homicide
cases is even stronger and, thus, the appellate courts' extension of
Lynch to the non-homicide context was fair.
While addressing some concerns, however, this argument ignores
the systemic and prejudicial concerns involved when the court allows
evidence of a victim's prior bad acts in this context. While the availa-
bility of the victim's testimony could weigh in favor of admitting such
evidence, the systemic and prejudicial concerns still weigh heavily in
favor of excluding it.233 Regardless of whether the victim is dead or
alive, evidence of the victim's prior bad acts has the potential to cloud
230. See supra notes 55-76 and accompanying text (discussing the policy rationales that sup-
port admissibility of specific act evidence that is offered by the defendant to prove that the
victim was the aggressor).
231. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that the probative
value of specific act evidence is minimal because the prior bad act may have been exceptional or
unusual).
232. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that the state
should not be forced to anticipate and prepare to rebut every specific prior act of violence of a
victim).
233. See supra notes 66-70, 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing the systemic concern that
admissibility of such evidence leads to inefficiency and litigation of collateral issues; the prejudi-
cial concern that the jury will find the defendant not guilty because the victim is an unsavory
character; and the prejudicial concern that it is unfair to allow the defendant to introduce the
type of evidence that is inadmissible against him).
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the issues, confuse the jury, and create mini-trials.234 Moreover, ad-
mitting such evidence undeniably creates a double standard in favor
of the defendant.235 Thus, due to the prejudicial and systemic con-
cerns, admissibility of such evidence should be limited to those in-
stances in which the need for information is the greatest and the
defendant's risks are the highest, namely, in homicide cases.
Finally, the appellate courts' third extension of Lynch is improper
because Lynch does not stand for the authority that all types of prior
bad acts, even those that did not result in a conviction, should be ad-
mitted. Not all types of the prior bad acts are probative of the victim's
character.236 The danger in admitting such evidence is apparent.
First, evidence of situations that never resulted in an arrest, much less
a conviction, is open to exaggeration and fabrication. 237 In addition,
this evidence implicates the systemic concerns of inefficiency, jury
confusion, and litigation of collateral issues.238
As the above discussion illustrates, Illinois needs to change its cur-
rently overbroad rule on the admissibility of specific act evidence that
is offered by the defendant who asserts self-defense to prove that the
victim was the aggressor. The question is whether Illinois should re-
turn to a strict exclusionary rule or whether there is an alternative rule
that strikes a proper balance between the strict exclusionary rule of
pre-Lynch and the overly broad admissibility rule of post-Lynch. The
next section will focus on the various approaches that Illinois could
adopt.
B. Alternatives to the Currently Overbroad Rule of Admissibility
There are a variety of alternatives that Illinois could adopt to
amend its currently overbroad rule of admissibility. Illinois could
adopt the Cook County State's Attorney's Office's proposed statute
which would return the Illinois rule to the pre-Lynch strict exclusion-
ary rule.239 In addition, there are a number of alternative rules that
234. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text (discussing the systemic concerns of al-
lowing in such evidence).
235. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing the double standard that admit-
ting such evidence creates).
236. See supra notes 84-124 and accompanying text (discussing the pre-Lynch cases).
237. See supra notes 62-63, 71-76 and accompanying text (discussing the prejudicial nature of
specific act evidence).
238. See supra notes 66-70, 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing the systemic concerns
involved in admitting such evidence).
239. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text (discussing the Cook County State's At-
torney's Office's proposed statute); see also infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text (discussing
the problems of this statute).
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Illinois could adopt which lie between the two extremes of total exclu-
sion and total inclusion.
One such alternative rule (hereinafter the "Connecticut Rule") is to
restrict the admissibility of a victim's prior bad acts to only prior con-
victions for a violent offense.240 Another alternative rule (hereinafter
the "District of Columbia Rule") is to limit the types of cases in which
proof of a victim's prior acts of violence may be made at all, but not to
restrict the evidence to convictions only.241 For instance, the court
may allow such evidence only in criminal cases242 or only in homicide
cases.243 In order to determine the proper rule for Illinois, one must
examine the advantages and disadvantages of each of these three al-
ternative rules.
1. The Cook County State's Attorney's Office's Proposed Rule
As previously mentioned, the Cook County State's Attorney's Of-
fice has proposed a statutory remedy to the current Illinois rule.244
This statute would prohibit the use of any type of specific act evidence
to prove a victim's propensity for violence. In effect, this statute
would return Illinois to the pre-Lynch rule of strict inadmissibility. 245
This statute would arguably make the prosecutor's job an easier one
because he would not have to ferret out, and prepare to defend, all
prior bad acts that could possibly be brought out at trial.246 In addi-
tion, this statute would eliminate the procedural and systemic con-
cerns of inefficiency, jury confusion, and extended trials. 247 Finally,
240. This position is the one adopted by Connecticut in State v. Miranda, 405 A.2d 622, 625
(Conn. 1978), and Utah in State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 96 (Utah 1992). See supra notes 217-23
and accompanying text (discussing other jurisdictions' approach to this issue).
241. See Harris v. United States, 618 A.2d 140, 144 (D.C. 1992) (allowing evidence of specific
instances of a victim's prior violent conduct only in homicide cases); Klaes v. Scholl, 375 N.W.2d
671, 674-75 (Iowa 1985) (refusing to allow such evidence in a civil assault case); see also notes
217-23 and accompanying text (discussing various jurisdictions' approach to this issue).
242. See Klaes, 375 N.W.2d at 674-75 (refusing to allow such evidence in a civil assault case);
see also supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text (discussing other jurisdictions' approach to
this issue).
243. See Harris v. United States, 618 A.2d 140, 144 (D.C. 1992) (allowing evidence of specific
instances of a victim's prior violent conduct only in homicide cases); see also supra notes 217-23
and accompanying text (discussing other jurisdictions' approach to this issue).
244. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text (discussing the Cook County State's At-
torney's Office's proposed statute).
245. See supra notes 84-124 and accompanying text (explaining the rule in Illinois prior to
Lynch).
246. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing the fourth rationale for prohib-
iting such evidence).
247. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (discussing the second and third prohibition
rationales).
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the proposed statute would "even the playing field" in that the de-
fendant would not be at a procedural advantage.2 48
A return to a rule of strict inadmissibility, however, would ignore
the highly probative value that some types of specific act evidence
have, namely convictions.249 In this sense, a strict rule of inadmissibil-
ity would not further the quest for the truth. It also would ignore the
need to give a defendant charged with murder greater latitude in pre-
paring his defense. Thus, a rule of strict inadmissibility seems as poor
an option as a rule of overly broad admissibility.
2. The Connecticut Rule
The Connecticut Rule's solution is to restrict the admissibility of a
victim's prior bad acts to only prior convictions for a violent of-
fense.250 Under this rule, evidence of a victim's prior bad act that did
not result in a conviction is strictly inadmissible. There are four pri-
mary advantages to the Connecticut rule, the first of which is that it
creates a bright line rule of admissibility that is easy to administer.
Courts are not free under the Connecticut Rule to arbitrarily deter-
mine which prior bad acts are probative and which are not.
This rule's second advantage is that "juries are not exposed to in-
flammatory testimony of dubious substantive value, the express pur-
pose of which is to justify allegedly criminal action."'2 51 As previously
mentioned, evidence of situations that never resulted in a conviction is
open to fabrication, exaggeration and jury misuse.252 Thus, the de-
fense can make the incident sound as bad as possible in an attempt to
convince the jury that the victim got what he deserved.253 In contrast,
evidence of a conviction is not open to fabrication. A conviction is the
result of a factual inquiry supervised by the court and governed by the
rules of evidence. Consequently, convictions are inherently more reli-
248. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that the defend-
ant should not be able to use this evidence when the prosecution is prohibited from using the
same type).
249. See supra notes 57-61, 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing the probative value of
specific act evidence); see also People v. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (Ill. 1984) (holding that
prior battery convictions are highly probative because they show aggressive and violent
tendencies).
250. This position is the one adopted by Connecticut, State v. Miranda, 405 A.2d 622, 625
(Conn. 1978), and Utah, State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 96 (Utah 1992). See also supra notes 217-
23 and accompanying text (discussing other jurisdictions' approach to this issue).
251. Horton, supra note 53, at 458.
252. See supra text accompanying note 237 (explaining that evidence of a victim's prior bad
acts that did not result in a conviction is open to exaggeration and fabrication).
253. See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text (articulating the different rationales that
favor exclusion of specific acts evidence).
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able and less unfairly prejudicial to either side than the testimony of
occurrence witnesses or records made out of court.
The Connecticut Rule's third advantage is that it eliminates the con-
cern of encouraging mini-trials. 2 54 As mentioned, evidence of a prior
conviction is not open to fabrication. Thus, unlike bad acts that never
resulted in a conviction, the jury will not have to determine whether
the incident ever occurred. Rather, the defendant would simply offer
into evidence a certified letter of conviction which the jury could use
to determine the ultimate issue, namely, whether the defendant or the
victim was the aggressor.
The Connecticut Rule's fourth and final advantage is that the prose-
cution would not have to prepare to rebut every prior bad act; rather,
the prosecution only has to prepare to defend or to rebut prior convic-
tions. These convictions are easily discoverable because the state only
needs to check the victim's criminal record; thus, the concern about
surprise would be eliminated.
3. The District of Columbia Rule
The District of Columbia Rule's approach is to limit the types of
cases in which proof of a victim's prior acts of violence may be made
at all, but to not restrict the evidence to convictions only.2 55 For in-
stance, the court may allow such evidence only in criminal cases256 or
only in homicide cases.2 57 This rule is based on two assumptions.
First, this rule assumes that the concerns of inefficiency, jury confusion
and misuse of evidence, and litigation of collateral issues remain con-
stant from a homicide case to a non-homicide case. Secondly, this rule
assumes that the concern over potential prejudice to the defendant is
greater in a homicide case because the defendant stands to lose
more.25 8 Thus, such evidence is admissible in homicide cases and not
in others.
254. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (discussing the third rationale for excluding
specific act evidence in this context).
255. See Harris v. United States, 618 A.2d 140, 144 (D.C. 1992) (allowing evidence of specific
instances of a victim's prior violent conduct only in homicide cases); Klaes v. Scholl, 375 N.W.2d
671, 674-75 (Iowa 1985) (refusing to allow such evidence in a civil assault case); see also notes
217-23 and accompanying text (discussing various jurisdictions' approach to this issue).
256. See Klaes, 375 N.W.2d at 674-75 (refusing to allow such evidence in a civil assault case);
see also supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text (discussing other jurisdictions' approach to
this issue).
257. See Harris, 618 A.2d at 144 (allowing evidence of specific instances of a victim's prior
violent conduct only in homicide cases); see also supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing other jurisdictions' approach to this issue).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 230-35 (arguing that the appellate courts were unwise
to extend the Lynch rule to the non-homicide context).
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The principal benefit of this position is that it protects a defendant's
due process rights to defend against criminal prosecution where the
defendant stands to lose life or liberty.259 Conversely, in all cases
where the stakes are less than punishment for murder, defendants are
barred from using specific act evidence at all. Rather, a defendant
would be limited to using reputation evidence to establish who was
the probable aggressor.
The disadvantage to the District of Columbia Rule is that it does
not limit the type of evidence to prior convictions only. Thus, the rule
does not address the concerns of inefficiency, jury confusion and mis-
use of evidence, and litigation of collateral issues that are implicated
by the admissibility of unconvicted prior bad acts.260 Accordingly, in a
homicide case, the defendant is free to offer evidence that has ques-
tionable substantive value because it is open to exaggeration and
fabrication and that has the potential to result in lengthy trials and
unjust results. 261
4. The Differing Effects of Each of the Alternative Rules
To understand the different effects of these alternative rules on the
trial process, it is useful to examine each of these rules in conjunction
with the following hypothetical: Jay and Tim are in the corner of a bar
drinking. The bar is dark, crowded and loud. After Jay and Tim have
both had a number of drinks, they get into a shouting match. Due to
the crowded conditions of the bar, nobody can tell who started the
shouting match. The men leave the bar at the same time and go out to
the parking lot. Ten minutes later, Jay runs into the bar and tells the
bartender that he and Tim were fighting outside and that he shot and
killed Tim. Jay has a prior murder conviction for which he is currently
on parole. Tim has a prior battery conviction. In addition, three
weeks before his death, Tim was involved in an altercation with an-
other person. While Tim was waiting in line for beer at a football
game, a woman named Katie shoved him. Tim shoved her back.
When Katie heard that Tim had been killed, she contacted Jay to tell
him about the incident; however, in Katie's version, Tim is the one
who shoved her and she never shoved him. However, before Jay's
259. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional imperative of
allowing a criminal defendant sufficient latitude in preparing his defense).
260. See supra notes 55-76 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales behind excluding
specific act evidence); see also supra text accompanying notes 236-38 (identifying the advantages
of a rule that limits specific act evidence to prior convictions).
261. See supra text accompanying notes 236-38 (articulating the dangers of such evidence).
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conversation with Katie, Jay had no knowledge of either Tim's prior
conviction or the shoving match between Katie and Tim.
At trial, Jay asserts self-defense and claims that Tim was the aggres-
sor. Jay wants to present a certified copy of Tim's prior battery con-
viction and testimony from Katie to prove that Tim was the aggressor
and that Jay was acting in self-defense. The prosecution wants to pres-
ent a certified copy of Jay's prior murder conviction to prove that Jay
was not acting in self-defense; rather, he simply murdered Tim.262
Under the Cook County State's Attorney's Office's proposed
rule,2 63 the court would not allow Jay to offer evidence of either Tim's
prior conviction or of Tim's shoving match with Katie. First, Jay can-
not offer the evidence to prove that he was afraid of Tim because he
was not aware of the acts at the time in question. In addition, Jay is
not able to offer the evidence to prove that Tim was the aggressor
because the State's Attorney's proposed statute operates to preclude
this type of evidence to prove that the victim was the aggressor. Ar-
guably, the latter effect is the pitfall of the proposed statute because it
ignores the highly probative value that the prior conviction would
have in determining whether Jay or Tim had been the aggressor.
Under the Connecticut Rule, Jay would be allowed only to offer
evidence of Tim's prior battery conviction; Katie's testimony about
the shoving match would be inadmissible. This seems a just result be-
cause of the minimal probative value and the prejudicial impact that
the testimony concerning the shoving match could have on the trial.
Tim and Katie were the only parties involved in the shoving match;
however, Katie can testify and Tim cannot. Katie can make any type
of accusation and deny any responsibility for the fight. Tim is not
there to defend himself.
In addition, the question as to who caused the shoving match is a
collateral matter. Allowing extrinsic evidence regarding this issue
would be a waste of time and could mislead the jury. Moreover, the
prosecution could easily prepare to defend against the prior battery
conviction because Tim's criminal record, on file with the state, would
be easy to obtain.
262. Under the current Illinois rule, Jay would be allowed to offer both the evidence of Tim's
prior conviction and Katie's testimony concerning Tim's prior bad act. The prosecution, how-
ever, would not be allowed to offer evidence of Jay's prior murder conviction in order to prove
that he murdered Tim. See supra notes 164-209 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois' cur-
rent rule on admissibility established by the Illinois appellate courts' interpretation of Lynch).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 210-16, 244-48 (discussing and analyzing the Cook
County State's Attorney's Office's proposed statute).
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The Connecticut Rule's primary problem is that Jay would be al-
lowed to offer this evidence regardless of whether Tim had been killed
or merely injured. Arguably, if Tim had only been injured, the evi-
dentiary balancing test would weigh in favor of excluding this evi-
dence. If Tim were alive, the prosecution could simply call him to tell
his version of the events in question. The jury could then decide from
the credibility of the witnesses which of the versions was the true ver-
sion. Thus, the need for additional evidence is mitigated. In addition,
Jay is not subject to as great of potential punishment; therefore, the
need to allow him greater latitude in preparing his defense is not as
strong. Thus, in the interest of efficiency and fairness, the court
should not allow Jay to offer evidence of Tim's prior convictions or his
fight with Katie.
Under the District of Columbia Rule, the hypothetical's outcome
would not differ from the outcome under the current Illinois' rule be-
cause this is a homicide case. Thus, Jay is allowed to offer evidence of
both Tim's prior conviction and Katie's testimony. However, if Jay
had merely injured Tim and had not killed him, Jay would be pre-
cluded from offering evidence of both the prior conviction and Katie's
testimony. While the additional evidence would add time and possi-
bly raise the systemic and prejudicial concerns discussed above, the
rule grants greater protection to the defendant when he stands to face
harsher penalties.
C. This Comment's Proposed Rule
Based on the above discussion, the author recommends that Illinois
adopt the following legislation to govern the admissibility of such
evidence:
725 ILCS 5/5/115-16. Prior bad act by the victim as evidence.
a. In prosecutions for crimes involving the use of force by a defend-
ant, where the defendant asserts that he was justified in using such
force pursuant to Section 7-1 of this Code, evidence of the victim's
prior bad act is not admissible unless:
1. such prior bad act was actually known to the defendant at the
time he committed the crime being prosecuted; or
2. in a homicide case, such prior bad act is offered to prove that the
victim was the aggressor, the prior bad act is a conviction for a vio-
lent offense, and the offered evidence is in the form of a certified
letter of conviction.
b. This section shall not be construed to alter existing law regarding
the use of prior convictions as impeachment.
This recommended statute combines the best features of the possi-
ble alternative rules. First, the statute leaves intact the current rule
2231996]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
that a defendant may offer in unrestricted evidence of a victim's prior
bad acts of which the defendant was aware in order to prove that the
defendant was reasonably afraid of the victim. In addition, it is a
bright-line rule that allows the defendant who is charged with murder
to prove circumstantially that the victim was the aggressor by evi-
dence of a prior conviction.
Thus, the rule combines the advantages of the Connecticut Rule
and the District of Columbia Rule while eliminating the disadvantages
of both. This proposed statute is the best way to balance all of the
competing policy interests. This solution minimizes the systemic con-
cerns and prejudicial risks of specific act evidence while affording the
criminal defendant charged with the serious crime of murder the
greatest latitude in preparing his defense.
III. CONCLUSION
The Illinois rule on the admissibility of specific act evidence that is
offered to prove a victim's violent propensity when a defendant as-
serts self-defense needs to change. The current broad rule of admissi-
bility serves to allow in evidence that is not probative, that is highly
prejudicial, and that implicates the systemic concerns of jury confu-
sion, inefficiency, and collateral litigation.
Illinois needs a firm statutory rule that would restrict the type and
form of evidence to evidence of prior conviction for a violent offense
that is offered in a homicide case in the form of a certified letter of
conviction. This rule would ensure that the evidence is probative. In
addition, prosecutors would not have to prepare to defend every prior
bad act; rather, they would have to defend only those acts which are
on file in the form of a conviction with the state.
In addition, limiting the form to certified letters of prior convictions
limits the prejudicial impact of such evidence because juries would not
be exposed to inflammatory testimony. They would not have to hear
the gruesome details of the previous crime. Moreover, this form of
evidence limits the systemic concern of wasting time because the let-
ters could be entered by way of stipulation.
Restricting the admissibility of such evidence to homicide cases
would reserve the admissibility of this evidence to cases where the
stakes for the defendant are the highest. A defendant charged with
murder should be given latitude in preparing his defense, since he is
potentially subject to life imprisonment or death. Prior violent convic-
tions offered in the form of certified letters of conviction are suffi-
ciently probative and the stakes in a homicide case are sufficiently
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high to outweigh the remaining systemic concerns of admitting such
evidence.
The need for a statute, as opposed to a judicial change of the com-
mon law, is evident from the Illinois appellate courts' overbroad inter-
pretation of Lynch. Within the last fifteen years, the appellate courts
have changed the rule from one of strict inadmissibility with certain
exceptions to one that seemingly has no restriction on admissibility.
Without a statute, the trial judge is free to adopt whatever rule fits the
judge's personal philosophies. This gives the trial judge too much dis-
cretion and leads to too much uncertainty for the lower courts, prose-
cutors and defendants.
More importantly, the strong policy arguments behind the inclusion
or exclusion of such evidence make this type of issue one that is more
appropriate for the legislature than for the judiciary to resolve. The
proposed statute that this Comment recommends works the most ap-
propriate balance between the policy arguments favoring and oppos-
ing admissibility of such evidence. Moreover, by statutorily limiting
the admissibility of such evidence, the legislature would solidify the
Illinois rule into a workable solution that is not open for personal in-
terpretation and wide-spread abuse.
Admittedly, this rule will adversely impact the criminal defendant
who is asserting self-defense and wants to offer evidence of a victim's
prior bad act to prove that the victim was the aggressor. However, the
rule provides the defendant sufficient evidentiary avenues to prove a
self-defense claim while eliminating only the most prejudicial and
least probative type of character evidence. Moreover, the benefits of
this rule far outweigh the minimal and justified adverse impact on the
defendant. First, the criminal justice system will benefit from the im-
pact that this rule will have on the efficiency and integrity of the sys-
tem. Additionally, society as a whole will benefit from the justice that
this rule produces, as well as the costs that the rule eliminates. Finally,
victims will benefit from the justice that is served when the system
precludes the defendant from turning the victim into the villain in or-
der to escape his own culpability.
Erica Hinkle MacDonald
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